1-Acest articol este copiat !
2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.
“Fortune favours the bold.”
Following the defeat of Sextus Pompey, Lepidus was first to land troops on Sicily and capture several major towns. Feeling that Octavian treated him as a subordinate rather than an equal, he made to claim Sicily for himself, increasing his fiefdom while expelling Octavian. He then aimed to negotiate to hand Octavian Sicily and Africa, while being restored to Gaul and Hispania himself. His legions, however, were weary of fighting, and lured by Octavian’s promises of payment, began defecting to the young Caesar on mass. Lepidus surrendered, and although Octavian allowed him to retain the title of Pontifex Maximus (Head of priests), he was ejected from the triumvirate. Not wanting to upset the Italians again, Octavian settled his veterans outside of the peninsular this time, while also returning to their masters 30,000 slaves who had escaped to join Sextus Pompey. Lepidus’ public career over, he was now effectively exiled to his island villa at Cape Circei. He lived for another 23 years, seeing his son executed for an assassination plot against Octavian, and allowed to periodically return to Rome to partake in senatorial visits, though he largely faded into obscurity. The Roman Republic was now clearly divided betwixt Octavian in the west and Antony in the east.
In the east, Antony was presented with the ideal opportunity to interfere in Parthia when the ever-turbulent royal court was the King Orodes II murdered and replaced by his son Phraates IV. When he realised Octavian’s promised legions would not materialise, he turned to another major source of manpower in the east – Cleopatra’s Egypt. Wintering in Antioch in 37 BC, Antony amassed a huge army of 16 legions and 40,000 auxiliaries, with a total force of 200,000 men – more than double the size of Crassus’ force which had been annihilated at Carrhae, and more than treble the size of armies of Sulla and Lucullus which triumphed against Mithridates. The sheer size of his force declared an intention to conquer Parthia, or at least occupy their capital of Ecbactana and demand vassalage.
His campaign began well, moving to Armenia and removing the Parthian vassal king, restoring the buffer territory to the Roman sphere of influence. Pressing east, he captured Iberia, and forced its king to attack Albania, making both Roman protectorates, and expanding the republic to the Caspian Sea once more. He then marched south into media, entering Parthian territory, determined to force a pitched battle. The Parthians, though, had no intention of proffering pitched battle. After their smug supremacy that followed Carrhae, Bassus had restored Roman pride in defeating their forces that had looked to annex Roman Persia. They were now well aware of the legions’ strength, and knew that it took a very particular set of circumstances to defeat them – namely fighting on a large open plain, and wearing them down with a war of attrition. If they found a capable Roman commander who was unwilling to march across open plains and provide them with such an opportunity though, they would be severely hampered. If the legions could lure them into close combat, then their cavalry superiority could be negated and the Romans would have the advantage, as Bassus had demonstrated.
The refusal to fight saw Antony push ever further into Parthia territory, and soon he repeated Crassus’ mistake in not securing his supply route. Leaving his logistics train behind his army under the protection of two legions, the Parthians seized this opportunity to overwhelm the detachment and choke of Antony’s army. Antony looked to continue his campaign undeterred, though with supplies dwindling and his force failing to capture a regional capital, he began his retreat in October before winter could set in.
His retreat turned into a disaster, as his demoralised and hungry troops were harassed by the Parthians every step of the way. Struggling through mountainous terrain, the legions left a scorching hot summer for a bitterly cold winter in the inhospitable land. Around 25,000 died while Antony was retreating to reach Armenia, with his legions fighting 18 battles with the Parthians in one month as the king looked to cut off their escape. Reaching the buffer zone, he then quick-marched back to Syria to find refuge behind the Euphrates, though another 8,000 men died during this march. Around 80,000 men had died during Antony’s failed Parthian campaign – it was not as disastrous as Napoleon’s retreat from Russia, though is certainly similar in terms of retreating from hostile enemy territory, and losing a war despite not losing a battle
With his reputation severely tarnished back in Rome, Octavian launched his smear campaign against Antony in earnest. He argued that Antony was a man of low morals, abandoning his wife in Rome while he pursued his affair with Cleopatra in Alexandria. Worst of all he was accused of ‘going native’, turning from a proud Roman to an Egyptian. Cleopatra was portrayed as a foreign witch who has seduced him, and when Antony was repeatedly summoned to Rome, he declined every time to remain in Alexandria. Octavian declared that the civil wars were over, and that he would renounce his place as a triumvir if Antony would do the same. Antony, obviously, refused.
Antony again invaded Armenia in 34 BC, capturing the kingdom and naming his son with Cleopatra, Alexander Helios, the king. Returning to Alexandria, he held a triumph through the streets, outraging the Senate back in Rome. Gathering the city’s population around he and his family, Antony had an important announcement to make – he was formally ending his alliance with Octavian. As Octavian’s attacks on Antony increased in the Senate, numerous senators began heading east to defect to Antony. Octavian, however, had a trump card, and would soon make an announcement that would rock the Roman world, and turn popular support irrevocably against Antony.
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