Batalia de la Sybota

 1-Acest articol este copiat !

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1!

The Battle of Sybota took place in 433 BC between Isle of Corcyra and Corinth, and was, according to Thucydides, the largest naval battle between Greek city states until that time. It was one of the immediate catalysts for the Peloponnesian War.

Corinth had been in dispute with Corcyra, an old Corinthian colony which no longer wanted to remain under Corinthian influence. Corcyra, which had the second largest navy in Greece at the time, allied itself with Athens, an enemy of Corinth (as Corinth was allied with Sparta). Athens sent ten ships to Corcyra to reinforce the Corcyraean fleet, with instructions not to fight the Corinthian fleet unless they attempted to land on the island. Corinth, meanwhile, assembled a fleet of ships under the command of Xenoclides and prepared to sail to Corcyra.

Corcyra gathered a fleet under Miciades, Aisimides and Eurybatus, who made the Sybota islands their base of operations. The Athenian commanders, Lacedaimonius (the son of Cimon), Diotimus, and Proteas, sailed with them. Corcyra had 110 ships, plus the additional 10 provided by Athens, while Corinth had 150 ships. When the Corinthian ships arrived, the Corcyraeans formed their line of battle, with the Athenians on the right and their own ships making up the rest of the line in three squadrons. The Corinthian ships were lined up with the Megarians and Ambraciots on the right, the Corinthians on the left, and the remainder of their allies in the centre. Both sides fought with hoplites on their ships, along with archers and javelin-throwers, in a manner Thucydides calls "old-fashioned." Instead of ramming and sinking the other ships, both sides attempted to board their opponents' ships and fight what was essentially a land battle at sea. The Athenian ships, although they were part of the line, did not at first join the battle, as the Corinthians had not attempted to land.

The Corcyraean ships on the left routed the Corinthian right wing, chasing them all the way back to their camp on the coast, which they then burned. The Corinthian left wing, however, was more successful, and the Athenians were forced to come to the aid of their allies. Despite the Athenian intervention, the Corinthians were victorious, and sailed through the wreckage of defeated ships often killing survivors rather than taking prisoners (including, although they did not know it, some of their own allies who had been defeated on the right-wing). They did not kill everyone, however, and captured a number of prisoners.

The Corcyraeans and Athenians headed back to Corcyra to defend the island, but when the Corinthians arrived, they almost immediately retreated, as 20 more Athenian ships under the command of Glaucon were on their way. The next day, the new Athenian ships threatened a second battle if the Corinthians attempted to land on Corcyra. The Corinthians retreated completely rather than risk another battle. Both the Corinthians and Corcyraeans claimed victory, the Corinthians having won the first battle, and the Corcyraeans having avoided a Corinthian occupation of their island.

Soon after this battle, the Athenians and Corinthians fought again at the Battle of Potidaea, leading to a formal declaration of war from Sparta.

Elefanti de Razboi !Partea-1!

 1-Inceputurile folosiri lor in razboi dateaza din India secolelor 6-7-I-HR .

2-Darius-1 isi da seama de potentialul elefantilor de razboi 

3-La Gaugamela Darius foloseste 50  de elefanti impotriva armatei lui Alexandru-Macedon .

4-Atunci s-a pornit un altfel de razboi si anume Calul vs Elefantul .

5-Plutarh spunea ca Persi doreau sa formeze o uriasa armata de 1000-3000 elefanti cu care sa tina piept armatelor lui Alexandru-Macedon .

6-Alexandru Macedon a vazut potentialul in lupta dar si numeroase puncte slabe .

     1-Greu de manevrat si etc .

7-Alexandru Macedon formeaza un grup de 25-elefanti pentru luptele din Padurile-Asiei .

8-Aceasta arma este folosita si in Europa daca pot spune asa .

9-Egipteni folosesc elefanti in lupta de la Raphia-217-I-HR .

10-Numidieni adopta acest stil si chiar il imbunatatesc  !

         1-Antrenamente mai inteligente .

         2-Controlul mai bun si mai bine facut .

        3-Echipamente de aparare pentru Elefanti .

 

Mihai-Viteazul-Partea-3!

 1-In Septembrie 1595-Mihai-Viteazul cu ajutor de la Sigismund-Batory ii bate pe Turci la Bucov .

2-In 1596-Mihai castiga luptele de la Sofia-Plevna-Vidin .

3-Otomani ofera pace in anul 1596.

     1-O capcana spun .

4-Mihai-Viteazul incheie pace cu Imparatul-Rudolf  de Austria .

5-Mihai are timp pentru odihna si strangere de fonduri necesare-trupelor sale .

6-Statele-Crestine il vedeau ca pe un pericol in special Austria si Nobilimea-Transilvaneana .

7-Mihai-Viteazul incepe sa isi arate intentia pentru de unire cu Transilvania .

8-In 1599 -Mihai-Viteazul strange 40 mii de soldati si invadeaza-Transilvania .

9-18-Septembrie-1599 castiga la Selimber .

10-Mihai-Viteazul reuseste primul pas spre Unire .

Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-18!

 1-Acest articol este copiat .

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

“Rome’s losses in manpower had been appalling.”

Successive Carthaginian victories at Drepana and Phintias had regain the city’s naval supremacy, sweeping Rome from the Mediterranean. Despite this, a fear of Rome’s vaunted legions meant there was still no serious effort made to recapture Sicily and destroy the legions fruitlessly besieging Lilybaeum. Carthalo raided Italy without serious consequence, but there is no further mention of Adberbal or Hannibal the Rhodian. Hamilcar Barca was sent to Sicily to lead the Carthaginian forces there, but ships were steadily withdrawn and by 242 BC there was no longer any fleets stationed on the island. With the cost of equipping, maintaining, supplying and manning a quinquereme immense, much less the cost of doing so for entire fleets, rather than press its advantage, a frugal Carthage chose to scale back its navy and save its money.

Hamilcar did not have an army large enough to defeat the Roman legions, nor did he have naval support – he was essentially cut adrift in Sicily to continue a token resistance to the island now largely annexed by Rome. Despite these obstacles, he proved brilliantly successful in his guerrilla war against the republic, though this was hugely expensive for both sides. In 244 BC, Carthage requested a loan of 2,000 gold talents – around $3 billion USD – from Egypt, which was rejected. While their scaling back on the navy seems foolish in hindsight, it is perhaps understandable given their precarious financial situation. Hamilcar employed combined arms tactics and a scorched earth approach from his base at Eryx, north of Drepana, keeping the legions pinned down and preserving the Carthaginian foothold in Sicily. Being a merchant nation, Carthage never had access to the manpower, land and raw materials that Rome had in the much more fertile Italia. Carthage was looking to countenance that by expanding its territories in Africa (which at the time was a breadbasket), and extracting tribute from the Numidians. The Carthaginians had a previously successful strategy of merely wearing opponents down, which they expected to succeed this time to achieve an agreeable peace treaty.

However, the war was also taking its toll on Rome, which was bankrupt a year later. The Roman response would be the opposite of their Carthaginian enemies though. In 243 BC, the Roman Republic was not only bankrupt but depopulated too, as the number of men able to serve in the legions and the navy had fallen by almost a fifth since the start of the war. With no cash with which to continue the war, and barely enough men, the Senate appealed to patriotism, and what was essentially an early form of the war bonds that would be essential in funding the victorious Allies in World War II – the wealthiest citizens were asked to invest their private fortunes to build a new fleet, and provide their slaves to man the oars. This effort was successful, with wealthy aristocrats funding quinqueremes on the promise of repayment with interest from Carthaginian indemnity once the war was one. Now that Carthage had essentially decommissioned its navy, there was an ideal opportunity to reclaim the Mediterranean again. This new navy set sail to blockade the remaining Carthaginian garrisons at Lilybaeum and Drepena, finally defeating what remained of their forces in Sicily.

The result of the innovative Roman initiative saw a fleet of 200 quinqueremes built, equipped and crewed without cost to the state. The Romans modelled their ships on the one they had caught the blockade runner Hannibal the Rhodian in, producing high quality quinqueremes while continuing to abandon the corvus, improving the speed and handling but necessitating a change in tactics for the Romans – now they would need to be superior sailors, rather than just superior soldiers.

In 242 BC the Consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus and the Praetor Quintus Valerius Falto led the 200 quinqueremes and 700 transports with supplies and legionary reinforcements to Sicily. Catulus seized the Drepana harbour and the Lilybaeum anchorage with no Carthaginian fleet to contest the waters. Strong squadrons were kept at each city to maintain an iron grip on their blockade, while also using the time to drill the crews in manoeuvres and exercises. The crews were treated and fed well to ensure they would be prepared for the coming battle. Impressed with their command, the Senate extended the imperium of both Catulus and Falto as Proconsul and Propraetor respectively. The garrisons of Lilybaeum and Drepana held firm, as did Hamilcar’s force in Eryx, though without supplies they could not hold on indefinitely. Carthage was pressed for time and supplies, and took nine months to find the 10,000 men and resources to man the 250 quinqueremes and 300 transports sent to relieve the cities. Despite raising such a force, they had not the time to properly train them.

Hanno took charge of the Carthaginian relief effort, assembling the fleet in secret off Hiera (Holy Island), the westernmost of the Aegates Islands, waiting for a strong westerly wind to allow them to launch a surprise attack on Lilybaeum, 28 miles away. Repeating the process of several years prior, they would then unload supplies and take onboard much of the garrison to act as marines with which to attack the Roman fleet. The fleet arrived at Hiera in March 241 BC, and was spotted by Roman scouts. Catulus abandoned his blockade, taking a full complement of marines for each of his 200 quinqueremes from the besieging legions and then sailed for the enemy fleet, anchoring off the island of Aegusa, ten miles off Sicily. The following morning there was a westerly wind and current, emboldening Hanno to set sail for Lilybaeum.

Catulus now had to compare the risks of attacking into the wind against allowing Hanno to reach Sicily and relieve the Carthaginian forces there. Despite the unfavourable conditions, the Proconsul set out to intercept the Carthaginian fleet. The Roman ships were stripped of their masts, sails and unnecessary equipment to make them lighter (and thus sit higher in the water) in the rough conditions. Catulus himself was injured from an earlier engagement, and thus command fell to Falto.

The two fleets met west of the island of Phorbantia (modern Levanzo), where the Roman fleet cut their anchors to further reduce weight (many have since been found here by archaeologists), with each weighting over a quarter of a tone (270kg – 600 lb). The Romans formed a single line of ships and rowed into the wind, through heavy swell, while the Carthaginians, forced to engage, lowered their sails and attacked. The Battle of Aegates Islands saw the Roman ships enjoy far greater mobility, while the Carthaginian ships which were burdened with supplies were cumbersome. Their inexperienced crews were also short of marines, having intended to stock up on them from the Lilybaeum garrison. The Romans quickly gained the upper hand, sinking 50 Carthaginian ships and capturing 70, including their 10,000-strong crew. Despite this, the battle was bitterly fought, with Rome losing 30 of its own ships and seeing another 50 damaged. The rest of the Carthaginian fleet was saved only by an abrupt change in the wind, allowing them to raise their masts and flee from the Romans who had left their behind. The remnants of the fleet returned to Carthage, where Hanno was crucified for his failure.

Victory at the Battle of Aegates Islands had finally broken Carthage, and ensured the First Punic War was drawing to a close. Falto was granted a junior triumph, while Catulus built a temple to Juturna on the Field of Mars. Catulus now took the war to the island and the remaining Carthaginian strongholds. The Carthaginian Senate was unwilling to provide the resources to raise and equip a fresh fleet. Having taken nine months to create the previous fleet, the remaining Sicilian strongholds knew they could not hold out for a further nine months, and began to seek terms. Carthage now faced the daunting task of not only needing to raise a fleet to defeat Rome at sea, but needed to raise an army capable to destroying the legions in Sicily too. Rome had reached its naval zenith in the First Punic War, and would go on to stagnate thereafter, with no rival powers to match them on the Mediterranean. This complacency would see piracy rise and become a menace to the republic, with audacious pirates even attacking Ostia before Pompey the Great was finally empowered with the imperium of an emperor – rule of all the Mediterranean and 50 miles in land – almost 200 years later. The Carthaginian Senate ordered a disgusted and undefeated Hamilcar Barca to negotiate terms of surrender with Rome. The outraged general handed this task to his adjutant, Gisco, as he began to harbour hopes of returning to war with Rome, a Rome he did not believe had been lost. That hatred of Rome, that need for vengeance and for justice, would be one of the key values he would pass on to his son Hannibal, who would make Rome weep in the decades to follow.

Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-17!

 1-Acest articol este copiat .

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

Rome’s woe on the waves

Following his decisive victory over the Roman fleet at the Battle Drepana, the Carthaginian commander Adherbal dispatched his adjutant Carthalo with 100 ships to relieve their main base on Sicily. The fortified city of Lilybaeum, governed by Himilco, was one of Carthage’s last strongholds on the island, and was thus besieged by the legions determined to annex the rest of Sicily and end the First Punic War. Following the defeat of their Sicilian army at the Battle of Panormus, Carthage now depended on supplying Lilybaeum by sea, and blockade runners using their expert crews and knowledge of the area to keep the garrison supplied. Adherbal also sent ships to raid the Sicilian and Italian coasts, and the supply situation for the legions besieging Lilybaeum was severe, with them eating rotting meat and relying on grain from Hiero II of Syracuse to sustain them.

Carthage managed to supply Lilybaeum thanks to the exploits of the commander Hannibal, son of Hamilcar, who sailed through the blockade. He left the city with cavalry horses at night and sailed to Drepapa, repeating this process to supply the garrison. Hannibal the Rhodian then defied the Roman fleet by sailing around to spy on the town and report back to Carthage, his bold action provoking Pulcher to set sail and suffer the disastrous defeat at Drepana. Following the battle, Adherbal sent Roman prisoners and captured ships to Carthage, then sailed to Panormus and captured the 30 Roman ships and transports there being used to supply the besieging army. Carthalo’s expedition to Lilybaeum saw him burn some Roman ships and capture others, with a sortie from Himilco preventing the legions from assisting the navy.

Carthalo heard that another Roman fleet had sailed from Syracuse to Lilybaeum, and persuaded his war council to engage them at sea. He sailed with around 120 ships for Heraclea Minoa to intercept the Roman convoy, while Adherbal kept the main fleet at Drepana to guard against any further Roman threat. In Rome, the Consul Lucius Junius Pullus was in Italy when Pulcher’s fleet had been sunk at Drepana, though given the slow dissemination of news in the ancient world, he may well have been unaware of this reverse when he set sail himself in the summer of 249 BC with 60 warships. He was joined by a further fleet at Messina, now commanding some 120 quinqueremes to protect 800 transports, which were loaded with supplies for the legions besieging Lilybaeum. Rome had already lost a supply fleet at Panormus, and with the legions undertaking the siege resorting to eating rotting meat, the passage of this one was crucial. Junius likely learnt of Pulcher’s defeat after arriving in Sicily, and thus chose not to sail along to north coast, thus avoiding the Carthaginian fleet, instead sailing along the south coast of the island.

Junius sailed to Syracuse, which had a huge harbour to accommodate his fleet. Hiero II supplied them with corn and other provisions, which Junius then loaded onto the transport and sent half, under the command of his quaestors, to Lilybaeum while he remained in Syracuse to provision the rest of the fleet while rounding up the stragglers and survivors of Drepana. Carthalo had anchored at Heraclea Minoa, with lookouts searching for the Roman fleet. He was soon alerted of their approach, and sailed out to engage them.

Learning of the approach of an unexpected Carthaginian fleet – the Romans had thought they were all on the north coast – the quaestors sailed east to take sanctuary at the town on Phintias. With no harbour, they lined the ships up against the shore and requisitioned catapults to use for defence against the Carthaginian attack. Carthalo approached, expecting a panicked flight, but then saw the fortified Roman position. He captured a few of the outlying ships and then, deciding not to endanger his own fleet against strong defences, hid in the mouth of a nearby river as he waited for the Roman fleet to depart. What followed was an unusual waiting game – Carthalo had the faster ships, though only had what supplied he could capture from the Romans, while the Romans had ample supplies, though had slower ships, and were aware that the legions besieging Lilybaeum were in desperate need of the supplies.

Carthalo’s wait was interrupted when he received news of Junius approaching with the rest of the ships from Syracuse. In this he had an advantage over the Roman fleet at Phintias, which did not have scout ships patrolling the waters. Carthalo snuck away to intercept this new fleet, leaving those at Phintias unaware of his movements, and thus making no effort to sail out to the relief of Junius – something difficult to coordinate in a time lack modern communications. Had both fleets known, they could have used their overwhelming numbers to surround Carthalo, whose fleet was now betwixt them, to compensate for their slower speeds owing to the transports. Junius also anchored on the shore when he saw the approaching Carthaginian fleet, declining battle. There was now the situation of two Roman fleets anchored off shore with the Carthaginian fleet betwixt them – though neither of the Roman fleets knew of this positional advantage.

Carthalo had to act quickly before the Romans could learn of their situation and act, though his planning was interrupted by news from his local scouts. Familiar with the Sicilian weather patterns, he was alerted to an incoming storm. Carthalo thus sailed east, away from both Roman fleets, rounding Cape Pachynon to ride out the storm. The Roman fleet was slow to resume its westward journey, its cumbersome warships slowed down further by the huge transports they were towing. The Battle of Phintias had cost Rome very little, despite being a strategic defeat, though as with previously, their navy’s worst enemy would prove to be Mother Nature.

Approaching Camarina, the Roman fleet was struck by the full force of the approaching storm. The fleet was again wrecked by the weather, with only two ships surviving. Among them were Junius, who resumed his voyage to Lilybaeum, though now without the needed supplies, and having seen tens of thousands more Romans and allies perish beneath the waves of the Mediterranean.

Junius set about assuming command of the Lilybaeum siege, arranging for supplies to be brought overland. He occupied the city of Eryx, fortified Akellos, and during his work on the island was caught by Carthalo. He was freed in 247 BC during a prisoner exchange, returned to Rome and committed suicide to avoid standing trial. His co-Consul Pulcher had returned after his disaster at Drepana and, following the death of Junius, arrogantly nominated a freedman as dictator, and was forced to resign by the Senate before a Master of Horse could be nominated. This scandal hastened Pulcher’s own downfall, and he was convicted of sacrilege and exiled.

The situation in Sicily was now desperate, and Rome’s reverses at sea, coupled with disastrous storms, had seen its naval superiority annihilated. Aulus Atilius Calatinus was appointed dictator and dispatched to Sicily. Having already rebuilt fleets after the storm of 255 BC sunk 600, and the storm of 253 BC sunk a further 150, it would be seven more years before Rome built a new fleet. For now, Carthage ruled the waves again.

Despite that, Carthage was not a martial nation, and showed little inclination to press home its advantage and bring the First Punic War to an end. Carthalo would raid the west coast of Italy, to limited effect, and the Carthaginians still did not feel confident to build up a fresh land army in Sicily. Hence the war devolved into stalemate, Rome continuing to besiege Drepana and Lilybaeum, though lacking the ability to storm either city and now lacking the navy to prevent them from being continually resupplied by sea. Rome controlled most of the land of Sicily, though Carthage could not be dislodged. Instead of investing in its military to conclude the war, Carthage sought to wind down its expenditure. Fleets were decommissioned, as operating hundreds of quinqueremes was a huge drain on finances, manpower and resources. Rather than now maintaining, crewing and provisioning its huge amount of ships, then using them to blockade Rome and launch a serious campaign into Italy, Carthage removed its ships to save money. One seemingly minor action taken by Carthage would have huge consequences for the future, for in 274 BC they sent a new commander to lead what little of their forces remained in Sicily – Hamilcar Barca.

Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-16!

 1-Acest articol este copiat !

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1!

“Well if they are not hungry, then perhaps they are thirsty.”

By 250 BC the Roman Republic was looking to complete its annexation, and in so doing end the First Punic War, by driving the Carthaginians out of their last remaining strongholds of Lilybaeum and Drepana in the west. Repeated attempts to storm the former failed, as did futile attempts to blockade the harbour, and so the legions dug in for a siege, which would last nine years.

The use of the innovative bridging method known as the corvus (crow) had allowed the Romans to turn themselves from maritime novices to a dominant force in the Mediterranean. This had essentially turned naval battles into land ones, as rather than relying on ramming and manoeuvring, the Romans now relied on boarding enemy ships. The corvus had granted the Roman victory at Mylae, Sulci, Ecnomus and Cape Hermaeum, but also made the ships unseaworthy and contributed to the annihilation of their fleet in a storm which left over 100,000 dead, and was thus abandoned. Despite that, an unlikely victory at Panormus after two years of avoiding battle had seen Rome defeat the last land army of Carthage in Sicily.

Encouraged by this victory, the Romans had began the siege of Sicily with a large army under both the Consuls, Publius Claudius Pulcher and Lucius Junius Pullus. The fleet was rebuilt, and 200 Roman ships blockaded the harbour. Early in the blockade, 50 Carthaginian quinqueremes gathered off the Aegates Islands some 25 miles west of Sicily, then utilised a strong westerly wind to sail for Sicily before Rome could react. Up to 40,000 reinforcements for the garrison were unloaded, along with a stockpile of supplied, as they evaded the Romans by leaving at night, and evacuated the cavalry with them.

The Romans sealed the land approach to Lilybaeum with camps and walls, though an attempt to use a timber boom to blockade the harbour failed. This failure allowed the Carthaginian garrison to be repeatedly resupplied by blockade runners, light and manoeuvrable ships that relied on expert crews to avoid the Romans. Chief among them was Hannibal the Rhodian, who would taunt the Romans as he sailed past, only to eventually be captured by them. At additional 10,000 oarsmen were allocated to the Roman fleet to counter this, and the senior Consul Pulcher, supported by a war council, believed these gave him sufficient advantage to attack the Carthaginian fleet at Drepana. The Romans sailed on a moonless night to avoid detection.

On the way to Drepana, the Romans performed one of their sacred pre-battle rituals. It is easy to forget how superstitious and religious people of this era were, but these rituals and traditions played a key role in their lives. Often events were staged, to ensure that they were favourable, for unfavourable omens could cripple morale. Later campaigns in Greece would see Flamminius sacrifice over 20 bulls to achieve favourable readings from the entrails, while Julius Caesar managed to turn a bad omen on its head when he fell over while leaving his ship in Africa by rising with a pile of earth in his hand, declaring: “Africa, now I have a hold of you!” One of these rituals involved the ‘sacred chickens’ being proffered seed in the morning, with them eating it eagerly being a good omen, and them ignoring it being ill-fated – it seemed a fairly safe bet for generals by just keeping the chickens unfed beforehand! On this occasion, though, the chickens – likely feeling seasick – ignored the seed. Murmurs went through the ranks that the attack must be aborted, for the gods were against them. An outraged and practical Pulcher merely threw the chickens over the side of his ship, declaring: “Well if they are not hungry, then perhaps they are thirsty.”

The Romans were experiencing problems as they approached Drepana, struggling to maintain a tight formation in the dark, and the inexperience of the 10,000 news oarsmen showing. Morning thus found the Roman fleet spread out in a long line, with Pulcher’s ship at the rear to catch the stragglers. The Carthaginian commander Adherbal was caught by surprise, but his ships had been kept read to sail. He immediately ordered the garrison onboard to act as marines. Pulcher now had around 120 ships at his disposal, with a similar number for Adherbal, and each ship having a full complement of marines.

The most advanced Roman ships were at the mouth of the harbour to blockade it, but seeing that surprise was lost, Pulcher had them fall back to take up battle formation. Unsurprisingly on ships, in an age without modern communications, this ordered took some time to disseminate throughout the fleet, causing confusion and delay. Some Roman ships turned into the path of others, fouling the formation, and some of the inexperienced crews even ended up shearing the oars off their comrades in these crashes. Adherbal easily led his fleet through the Roman vanguard, which was in disarray, and continued west, passing betwixt the city and two small islands to enter open sea. With room to manoeuvre, the Roman advantage was now lost. Heading south, the Carthaginians formed a line of battle parallel to Pulcher’s, getting south of the Consul’s flagship and then echeloning to shore to cut off the Roman fleet from a retreat to Lilybaeum.

The Romans formed a line facing west, the shore behind them to protect their flanks, though the Carthaginian attack would expose this weakness in their formation. The Carthaginian ships were lighter and more manoeuvrable, their crews more experienced, and the Romans were now without their deadly corvus. If an individual Carthaginian ship was struggling it could reverse and withdraw, though if a Roman ship followed it then it was left vulnerable. The Romans relied on a tight formation for mutual protection, though this prevented them from advancing. The battle was hard fought throughout the day, with the Roman legionaries showing their quality when they managed to board enemy ships. Despite this they kept being outmanoeuvred, with exposed Roman ships rammed as the Carthaginians steadily built their advantage. Eventually Roman discipline collapsed, with several crews scuttling their ships to flee inland, and a breakout of 30 ships led by Pulcher were the only ones to escape. The Battle Drepana was an utter defeat for Rome, with 93 ships captured, many sunk, and 20,000 men killed or captured. It would be Carthage’s greatest naval victory of the war.

Shortly after the battle Adherbal was reinforced by Carthalo with a further 70 ships. Pulcher was recalled to Rome and charged with treason, though convicted of a lesser charge of sacrilege due to the incident with the chickens. He narrowly escaped a death sentence, and was exiled instead. His sister Claudia became infamous when she was obstructed in a street by the urban poor and wished aloud that he brother would lose another battle so to think the crowd. Adherbal now looked to press the Carthaginian advantage and relieve pressure on Lilybaeum. His adjutant Carthalo set sail with 100 ships to assist the city, and was soon to be enticed by news of a huge Roman supply convoy heading to the besiegers – an opportunity too good to pass up.

Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-15!

 1-Acest articol este copiat !

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

“The survivors of Bagradas River shared horrific stories of the Carthaginian cavalry and elephants.”

Emboldened by Roman losses, Carthage decided to take the initiative again in the First Punic War and resume campaigning in Sicily. They recaptured Akragas in 255 BC but, not feeling confident about defending the city, razed it instead. The Roman fleet was rapidly rebuilt, with 220 new quinqueremes exhausting the treasury. This new fleet set sail to attack Panormus (modern Palermo), one of the largest island cities still loyal to Carthage. Based on the northern coast, this important city of 70,000 people relied on trade and fishing, and as such had a lack of cultivated agricultural land surrounding it. Surrounded by dense forest, the legions were able to get close to walls and build the siege engines needed to breach them. As was the savagery of antiquity, once that breach was made, there could be no quarter. The inner town (citadel) surrendered after the outer fell, with 14,000 survivors paying their ransoms and the remaining 13,000 sold into slavery.

Much of inland western Sicily now defected to Rome: Ietas, Solous, Petra, and Tyndaris all came to terms. In 252 BC the Romans captured Thermae and Lipara, which had been isolated since Panormus fell. In response, Carthage landed reinforcements on the island under Hasdrubal, who had previously fought against the legions in Africa. 252 and 251 BC saw the Romans avoid battle, largely out of fear of the war elephants which had been shipped to Italy, following the awful tales from the survivors of Bagradas River. Despite having a smaller army than the Romans, it was Carthage who thus dominated the plains, while the legions stuck to the higher and broken up ground which would nullify the threat posed by the vaunted cavalry and elephants.

As summer turned to autumn in 250 BC, Hasdrubal was emboldened by the news that the Consul Gauius Furius Pacilus, assuming the campaigning season had ended, had left Sicily with half of the Roman army. Hasdrubal thus marched out of his stronghold at Lilybaeum for Panormus with 30,000 men, and betwixt 60 and 142 war elephants. Halting short of the city, he wrecked the harvest of Rome’s new allies to provoke the remaining Consul, Lucius Caecilius Metellus, to battle. Metellus had a pair of legions, both of which had been scattered to help gather in the harvest. Hasdrubal had him outnumbered three to one.

Metellus withdrew into Panormus, though Hasdrubal had anticipated this timidity. He advanced down the Oreto Valley, ruining the countryside as he went, and upon reaching the sea he forded the river and advanced to the city walls. Once the elephants began fording the river, Metellus sent his light infantry skirmishers out to hamper their passage, concentrating their javelins on the elephants. Being a major supply depot, the remaining townspeople were deployed to carry bundles of javelins forward, providing the velites with an inexhaustible supply to bombard the elephants with. The ground betwixt the river and city was covered in earthworks leftover from the Roman siege, which both shielded the Romans while impeding the elephants’ advance further still. The mahouts, eager to demonstrate their skills, pushed the beasts on, and soon were being pelted with missiles from the city walls too. Peppered with missiles and unable to retaliate, the elephants soon panicked and fled through the Carthaginian infantry which was following them.

Metellus himself was hiding with the bulk of his legions in the thick forests near the city gate, or just behind the gate ready to launch a sortie. When the elephants broke, they threw the Carthaginian army into disarray, disorientating it and demoralising the troops. Metellus seized the opportunity to attack its left flank, quickly folding the line and causing the Carthaginians to rout. Those who tried to fight were cut down in isolated and disorganised units, though there was no pursuit ordered of the fleeing army. Ten elephants were captured, and several more were added to the Roman forces in the following days. The Battle of Panormus was an unexpected victory for Rome, further asserting the republic’s hold over Sicily.

The victory, and especially the removal of the Carthaginian elephants, emboldened the Romans to manoeuvre freely around Sicily, with their enemies unwilling to proffer battle anew. Metellus received a triumph, in which he paraded his captured elephants, which were then slaughtered in the Circus Maximus. The elephants was adopted of the emblem of the Metelli family, featuring it on the coins they minted until the end of the republic. Later members of this family would play key roles as the republic collapsed, including being stripped of command in the Jugurthine War to enable the rise of Gaius Marius, supporting Sulla in his rise to the dictatorship, and winning the Sertorian War in Hispania which both thrust Pompey Magnus into the spotlight finished off the rogue state which had been the last refuge of the Marians.

The battle played a key role in helping the Romans to overcome their fear of elephants. The huge beasts were a formidable foe, and a daunting one to Italian soldier farmers who had likely seen nothing larger than a bear. Elephants would be trained to stamp on their enemies, and use their trunks and steel-clad tusks to kill them, while their sounds and smells could disrupt the most formidable cavalries – as Alexander had discovered at the Hydaspes. Bull elephants were often charged during must, further adding to their aggressive behaviour. Despite that, they were but animals themselves, and with careful planning and coordination could be overcome. Loud noises, unfamiliar animals like pigs, and missile weapons were ideal for thwarting elephants, or accepting a charge but providing a passage through the ranks – no animal will choose to charge into spears rather than an open corridor. If elephant charges could be halted, and the beasts panicked, they were liable to turn around and stampede through their own soldiers, wreaking havoc and providing an opportunity for a swift rout. The Romans would be deploying elephants themselves against the Greeks within 50 years, though within two centuries the unruly beasts would have been abandoned in the west as a weapon of war, becoming more of an entertainment novelty, such as when the Emperor Claudius shipped forty elephants to Britannia to awe the native Celts.

After the Battle of Panormus, Hasdrubal was recalled to Carthage and – as was their wont – was swiftly executed. His successor Adhubal decided that the large fortified city of Selinus could no longer be garrisoned, so evacuated and razed the settlement. Emboldened by their victory, the Romans had a fresh belief that the end of the war was in sight – even if it would be settled in Sicily, rather than Africa. Most of the island was now aligned to Rome, and the only major base remaining for Carthage was the large, fortified city of Lilybaeum. Take that, and the Carthaginians would not even have a Sicilian beachhead from which to land troops on the island. In 249 BC, the Consuls Publius Claudius Pulcher and Lucius Junius Pullus besieged the city. Their rebuilt fleet of 200 quinqueremes blockaded the city, and they knew that taking it would end the war in Sicily. But the Carthaginians were not ready to surrender yet, and their navy set sail to lift the blockade to ensure they would remain as the masters of Sicily.

Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-14!

 1-Acest articol este copiat !

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

“The subsequent tragedy was regarded as due to natural causes rather than to bad seamanship.”

Following the legions’ defeat at the Battle of Bagradas River, the Romans sent a fleet to evacuate the survivors from their failed African expedition. Some 350 quinqueremes were sent with more than 300 transports, aiming to relieve the survivors who were now besieged in Aspis. Both Consuls for 255 BC, Servius Fulvius Paetinus Nobilior and Marcus Aemilius Paullus, set sail with the vast fleet, capturing the island of Cossyra on the way.

The Carthaginians, flush from victory, mobilised their fleet on quinqueremes – largely the survivors from the Battle of Cape Ecnomus – to block the Roman retreat. They intercepted the Romans off Cape Hermaeum (modern Cape Bon), just north of Aspis. The forty Roman ships which had remained in Africa to support the legions over the winter made a sortie to join the main fleet. Despite their land success, the Carthaginians again floundered at sea. Concerned that they would be encircled by the behemoth Roman fleet, the Carthaginians sailed close to the coast. Despite this, they were outmanoeuvred and pinned against the beach, allowing many of them to be boarded with the corvus, forcing them to stand and fight or jump off and make for shore. Around 114 of the remaining Carthaginian ships were captured, along with their crews, and sixteen sunk. Roman losses were minimal, if any. The lack of soldiers serving as marines on the Carthaginian fleet, who instead relied on their rowers to manoeuvre instead of trying to board, played a decisive role in settling the battle in Rome’s favour.

The Roman fleet docked as Aspis where the garrison, now reinforced by the marines, swiftly dispersed their besiegers and gathered food from the surrounding countryside. The whole fleet then embarked, sailing for Sicily and landing on the south west corner. They proceeded along the south coast but in mid-July, betwixt the city of Kamarina and Cape Passaro in south east Sicily, a sudden summer storm erupted. This devastated the Roman fleet. Out of the 464 warships, 384 were sunk, as were 300 transports. The death toll was catastrophic, with 100,000 being a conservative estimate. Many of the casualties will have been the newly captured Carthaginian rowers, and many more Rome’s Italian allies. The corvus, which was proved so decisive in Rome’s battles against Carthage, actually had the adverse effect of making the ships unseaworthy. It would never be used again after this disaster.

It is easy to forget just how vulnerable ships in this era were, and how easily fleets could be decimated by storms. Ships sat low in the water, particularly when heavily loaded, with opening for the oars just a few feet from the waterline. Even slightly wavey conditions could begin to see the hull fill with water, which would need to be swiftly removed – later made easier by the invention of the Archimedes Screw. Roman ships were designed for the calm waters of the Mediterranean, had a lot of men aboard each, and would usually be put to shore each night – minimising the amount of water and supplies needed for such a large number of men. With ships often sailing closely together too, storms could often dash them against each other. The huge number of men aboard each ship only exacerbated the death toll, as did the fact that many of them could not swim, and soldiers were often wearing armour that was awkward to remove and would thus condemn them to a watery grave. Polybius criticised the poor judgement and seamanship prior to the storm, though both Consuls, who survived, were awarded a triumph in 254 BC for the victory at Cape Hermaeum. Scullard points out that this shows that “the subsequent tragedy was regarded as due to natural causes rather than to bad seamanship.”

Paullus would build a column at his own expense on the Capitoline Hill to celebrate his victory, adoring it with the prows of captured Carthaginian ships. This was destroyed by lightening in 172 BC. Despite the recent victory, the First Punic War was far from over. Roman fleets would again suffer from a storm, while Carthage would rediscover its maritime success. The victory that had looked closed following the landing of the African expedition now looked a long way off indeed.

Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-13!

 1-Acest articol este copiat!

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

The Battle of Bagradas River

The Roman invasion of Africa to bring an end to the First Punic War started well. The Consuls Regulus and Longus landed near Aspis (modern Kelibia) on the Cape Bon Peninsula and began ravaging the countryside. With their huge fleet having 90,000 rowers, plus the 26,000-strong legionary expeditionary force, there were a lot of mouths to feed. Some 20,000 slaves were captured, along with vast herds of cattle, and the city of Aspis following a brief siege. Given the logistical difficulties in feeding and supplying such a force in hostile territory, most of the expedition was recalled to Sicily under Longus. Regulus was left with 40 ships, 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to winter in Africa. The smaller force did not dent Rome’s hopes for victory – given Carthage operated on a model of using mercenaries from client states, Rome could still triumph by emboldening them to defect and thus leave the former Phoenician city isolated.

Regulus was an experienced commander, having enjoyed a triumph in 267 BC following his victory over the Salentini. He was told to expect reinforcements in the Spring, and continue weakening Carthaginian resistance until then. Regulus ventured inland, capturing the city of Adys, 40 miles south east of Carthage, while the Carthaginians recalled Hamilcar from Sicily with 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. The generals Hasdrubal and Bostar joined him, being placed in joint command of an army in similar size to the Roman force, though supplemented with cavalry and elephants. They set up camp near Adys and were surprised by a dawn attack from the Romans from two directions, and although their army was broken they suffered few casualties, including preserving their cavalry and elephants. Regulus’ follow up saw the legions capture Tunis, just ten miles from Carthage, and more of Carthage’s African possessions revolted against their overlord.

Refugees poured into Carthage in flight from Regulus, and food was running short. The city sued for peace, though an arrogant Regulus was so sure of victory that he demanded terms including the ceding of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica to Rome, paying all of Rome’s war expenses, an annual tribute, needing Roman permission to declare war, the provision of 50 warships, and the reduction of the Carthaginian navy to one ship. Unsurprisingly, the city refused. The Carthaginians continued their recruitment of mercenaries from across the Mediterranean, and large number of fighting men from Greece began to arrive, lured by Carthaginian gold. Among them was a Spartan commander Xanthippus, an expert in deploying and manoeuvring an army.

Xanthippus quickly bonded with the Carthaginian army, and persuaded the Senate that the strongest elements in their force, the cavalry and elephants, could excel on flat ground. Xanthippus himself may have faced such a force under Pyrrhus when the Epirote king attacked Sparta in the 270s BC. Although a committee of Carthaginian generals ostensibly remaining in operational control, Xanthippus became the de facto general of the army over the winter. As the prospect of decisive battle with the legions drew nearer, his skill at manoeuvring the army became more evident, and he assumed full command.

Xanthippus led out the Carthaginian army to engage the legions under Regulus at the Battle of Bagradas River (or Tunis) in 255 BC. His force included 100 elephants, 4,000 cavalry and 12,000 infantry, including 5,000 Sicilian veterans and mercenaries flanking many citizen militia. They set up camp in an open plain, only around a mile away from the Roman force of 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. The elephants formed a single line in front of Xanthippus’ centre, with his cavalry equally split into two blocks on the wings. The Romans had a deeper and denser formation than usual, designed to be an anti-elephant formation though one that shortened the frontage of the infantry and made them liable to being flanked. The Roman cavalry was on their flanks, with the velite skirmishers in front of the heavy infantry legionaries. Regulus planned to punch through the elephants with massed infantry, and then overcome the Carthaginian phalanx in its centre as to win the battle before he could be flanked.

The Carthaginian cavalry and elephants opened the battle, swiftly sweeping aside the vastly outnumbered Roman cavalry. The legionaries advanced, banging their swords and javelins to spook the elephants. The Italian allies, who overlapped the elephant line, quickly broke the Carthaginian right, chasing them back to their camp. The rest of the Roman infantry struggled against the elephants, who charged through the ranks to cause massive confusion and cavalries. When reading about such battles it is easy to forget that these were lived human experiences of people with swords and shields facing huge, armoured elephants, often bulls who had been driven to frenzy and trained to kill using hooves, tusks and trunk – a truly terrifying experience for farmers from central Italy. Despite this, some of the legionaries fought through the elephants and attacked the Carthaginian phalanx, only to find them effectively organised to resist them. Some of the Carthaginian cavalry now returned to attack the Roman rear and, having to fight on all sides, the legionaries’ forward momentum was halted.

The Romans still held form as their dense formation jammed them together, but the elephants were still able to rampage through their ranks. The cavalry pinned the legionaries in place and continued to hurl missiles into their flanks. Xanthippus then had the phalanx press forward and the Romans, now packed together, were butchered where they stood. Regulus and a small force fought their way out of the encirclement, but were pursued until he and his remaining 500 men surrendered. Around 13,000 Romans had been killed at Tunis, while only 800 sons of Carthage were lost. A force of 2,000 legionaries which had broken through to the Carthaginian camp, the Italian allies, did manage to escape back to Aspis. Despite this moment of glory, Bagradas River would be Carthage’s only land victory over Rome in the war.

Xanthippus feared the envy of the Carthaginian elite that he had outshone, so took his pay and swiftly returned to Greece rather than continuing to stay and organise their war effort. Regulus died in captivity, though later authors invented the tale of him returned to Rome with terms on condition that, should they not be accepted, he return to Carthage to be tortured to death, and so he advised the Senate to reject the terms, and duly returned to face torture and death, The Romans sent a fleet to evacuate their remaining legions, and the Carthaginian navy mustered to repel them at the Battle of Cape Hermaeum.