Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-18!

 1-Acest articol este copiat .

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

“Rome’s losses in manpower had been appalling.”

Successive Carthaginian victories at Drepana and Phintias had regain the city’s naval supremacy, sweeping Rome from the Mediterranean. Despite this, a fear of Rome’s vaunted legions meant there was still no serious effort made to recapture Sicily and destroy the legions fruitlessly besieging Lilybaeum. Carthalo raided Italy without serious consequence, but there is no further mention of Adberbal or Hannibal the Rhodian. Hamilcar Barca was sent to Sicily to lead the Carthaginian forces there, but ships were steadily withdrawn and by 242 BC there was no longer any fleets stationed on the island. With the cost of equipping, maintaining, supplying and manning a quinquereme immense, much less the cost of doing so for entire fleets, rather than press its advantage, a frugal Carthage chose to scale back its navy and save its money.

Hamilcar did not have an army large enough to defeat the Roman legions, nor did he have naval support – he was essentially cut adrift in Sicily to continue a token resistance to the island now largely annexed by Rome. Despite these obstacles, he proved brilliantly successful in his guerrilla war against the republic, though this was hugely expensive for both sides. In 244 BC, Carthage requested a loan of 2,000 gold talents – around $3 billion USD – from Egypt, which was rejected. While their scaling back on the navy seems foolish in hindsight, it is perhaps understandable given their precarious financial situation. Hamilcar employed combined arms tactics and a scorched earth approach from his base at Eryx, north of Drepana, keeping the legions pinned down and preserving the Carthaginian foothold in Sicily. Being a merchant nation, Carthage never had access to the manpower, land and raw materials that Rome had in the much more fertile Italia. Carthage was looking to countenance that by expanding its territories in Africa (which at the time was a breadbasket), and extracting tribute from the Numidians. The Carthaginians had a previously successful strategy of merely wearing opponents down, which they expected to succeed this time to achieve an agreeable peace treaty.

However, the war was also taking its toll on Rome, which was bankrupt a year later. The Roman response would be the opposite of their Carthaginian enemies though. In 243 BC, the Roman Republic was not only bankrupt but depopulated too, as the number of men able to serve in the legions and the navy had fallen by almost a fifth since the start of the war. With no cash with which to continue the war, and barely enough men, the Senate appealed to patriotism, and what was essentially an early form of the war bonds that would be essential in funding the victorious Allies in World War II – the wealthiest citizens were asked to invest their private fortunes to build a new fleet, and provide their slaves to man the oars. This effort was successful, with wealthy aristocrats funding quinqueremes on the promise of repayment with interest from Carthaginian indemnity once the war was one. Now that Carthage had essentially decommissioned its navy, there was an ideal opportunity to reclaim the Mediterranean again. This new navy set sail to blockade the remaining Carthaginian garrisons at Lilybaeum and Drepena, finally defeating what remained of their forces in Sicily.

The result of the innovative Roman initiative saw a fleet of 200 quinqueremes built, equipped and crewed without cost to the state. The Romans modelled their ships on the one they had caught the blockade runner Hannibal the Rhodian in, producing high quality quinqueremes while continuing to abandon the corvus, improving the speed and handling but necessitating a change in tactics for the Romans – now they would need to be superior sailors, rather than just superior soldiers.

In 242 BC the Consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus and the Praetor Quintus Valerius Falto led the 200 quinqueremes and 700 transports with supplies and legionary reinforcements to Sicily. Catulus seized the Drepana harbour and the Lilybaeum anchorage with no Carthaginian fleet to contest the waters. Strong squadrons were kept at each city to maintain an iron grip on their blockade, while also using the time to drill the crews in manoeuvres and exercises. The crews were treated and fed well to ensure they would be prepared for the coming battle. Impressed with their command, the Senate extended the imperium of both Catulus and Falto as Proconsul and Propraetor respectively. The garrisons of Lilybaeum and Drepana held firm, as did Hamilcar’s force in Eryx, though without supplies they could not hold on indefinitely. Carthage was pressed for time and supplies, and took nine months to find the 10,000 men and resources to man the 250 quinqueremes and 300 transports sent to relieve the cities. Despite raising such a force, they had not the time to properly train them.

Hanno took charge of the Carthaginian relief effort, assembling the fleet in secret off Hiera (Holy Island), the westernmost of the Aegates Islands, waiting for a strong westerly wind to allow them to launch a surprise attack on Lilybaeum, 28 miles away. Repeating the process of several years prior, they would then unload supplies and take onboard much of the garrison to act as marines with which to attack the Roman fleet. The fleet arrived at Hiera in March 241 BC, and was spotted by Roman scouts. Catulus abandoned his blockade, taking a full complement of marines for each of his 200 quinqueremes from the besieging legions and then sailed for the enemy fleet, anchoring off the island of Aegusa, ten miles off Sicily. The following morning there was a westerly wind and current, emboldening Hanno to set sail for Lilybaeum.

Catulus now had to compare the risks of attacking into the wind against allowing Hanno to reach Sicily and relieve the Carthaginian forces there. Despite the unfavourable conditions, the Proconsul set out to intercept the Carthaginian fleet. The Roman ships were stripped of their masts, sails and unnecessary equipment to make them lighter (and thus sit higher in the water) in the rough conditions. Catulus himself was injured from an earlier engagement, and thus command fell to Falto.

The two fleets met west of the island of Phorbantia (modern Levanzo), where the Roman fleet cut their anchors to further reduce weight (many have since been found here by archaeologists), with each weighting over a quarter of a tone (270kg – 600 lb). The Romans formed a single line of ships and rowed into the wind, through heavy swell, while the Carthaginians, forced to engage, lowered their sails and attacked. The Battle of Aegates Islands saw the Roman ships enjoy far greater mobility, while the Carthaginian ships which were burdened with supplies were cumbersome. Their inexperienced crews were also short of marines, having intended to stock up on them from the Lilybaeum garrison. The Romans quickly gained the upper hand, sinking 50 Carthaginian ships and capturing 70, including their 10,000-strong crew. Despite this, the battle was bitterly fought, with Rome losing 30 of its own ships and seeing another 50 damaged. The rest of the Carthaginian fleet was saved only by an abrupt change in the wind, allowing them to raise their masts and flee from the Romans who had left their behind. The remnants of the fleet returned to Carthage, where Hanno was crucified for his failure.

Victory at the Battle of Aegates Islands had finally broken Carthage, and ensured the First Punic War was drawing to a close. Falto was granted a junior triumph, while Catulus built a temple to Juturna on the Field of Mars. Catulus now took the war to the island and the remaining Carthaginian strongholds. The Carthaginian Senate was unwilling to provide the resources to raise and equip a fresh fleet. Having taken nine months to create the previous fleet, the remaining Sicilian strongholds knew they could not hold out for a further nine months, and began to seek terms. Carthage now faced the daunting task of not only needing to raise a fleet to defeat Rome at sea, but needed to raise an army capable to destroying the legions in Sicily too. Rome had reached its naval zenith in the First Punic War, and would go on to stagnate thereafter, with no rival powers to match them on the Mediterranean. This complacency would see piracy rise and become a menace to the republic, with audacious pirates even attacking Ostia before Pompey the Great was finally empowered with the imperium of an emperor – rule of all the Mediterranean and 50 miles in land – almost 200 years later. The Carthaginian Senate ordered a disgusted and undefeated Hamilcar Barca to negotiate terms of surrender with Rome. The outraged general handed this task to his adjutant, Gisco, as he began to harbour hopes of returning to war with Rome, a Rome he did not believe had been lost. That hatred of Rome, that need for vengeance and for justice, would be one of the key values he would pass on to his son Hannibal, who would make Rome weep in the decades to follow.