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It’s the night of August 2, 216 BC, and a horseman has just arrived in Rome bearing news of the most disastrous military defeat that the city has suffered in its 500-year history. We don’t know the exact number of casualties - estimates vary between 50,000 and 70,000 - but it’s been nothing less than a bloodbath. The battle has taken place in Apulia, in southeast Italy, about 300 miles south of Rome, just outside a town called Cannae. The initial report is that there are no survivors - later that report will prove to be false.
The victorious Carthaginian general Hannibal now offers, from afar, to ransom 8,000 prisoners on the condition that the Romans agree to peace terms. To increase the pressure on the Roman Senate - which will decide this proposal - Hannibal sends 10 highly distinguished Roman prisoners to make a personal appeal. The crisis for the Senate is whether to make peace with the enemy and save the lives of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Romans, or whether to hold firm. It is the most important decision the Roman Senate has ever had to make.
No one, at this point, knows the identity of the dead, but there is hardly a family that does not have a member who fought at Cannae who might, therefore, be a prisoner. Outside the Senate House, thousands of Romans are gathered, knowing that if someone they love is being held in Hannibal’s prison camp, their fate is about to be determined.
. . .
Rome Holds Its Breath:
The Romans hate Hannibal; he is their worst nightmare. The Roman historian Livy charges Hannibal with a formidable list of crimes, including “inhuman cruelty, perfidy worse than that of an ordinary Carthaginian, disregard for truth and sanctity, lack of fear for the gods, contempt for the sanctity of an oath, and the absence of any religious scruples.” Even so, Livy by no means lacks in admiration for Hannibal. He describes him as energetic, able to withstand extremes of temperature, and moderate in his consumption of food and drink. Hannibal is said to endure the same privations as his men are subjected to.
Hannibal is one of the most remarkable military leaders of all time. Until now, Hannibal’s life has been characterized by unrelieved harshness, deprivation, and discomfort. He is a lateral thinker with a natural aptitude to think outside the box, as his application of unconventional military tactics reveals time and again. He is also a keen student of human nature who consistently seeks to familiarize himself with the personalities of his opponents and then exploit their weaknesses to bring about their ruin.
Cannae is the moment he has waited for all his life - ever since his father, Hamilcar Barca, made him take a solemn oath “that he, Hannibal, would never be a friend of the Romans.” Those words have come down to us from Nepos, Hannibal’s Roman biographer. Hamilcar allegedly made his son take the oath at the age of nine before he took him on a military campaign to Spain. Hannibal would never know anything else but army life until his later years.
We don’t have any testimony from the Carthaginian side because the Carthaginians haven’t left us any writings. But it’s not improbable that Hannibal disseminated frightening reports of himself to create an image that would strike fear in the hearts of Romans.
. . .
At the time of this story, the Carthaginians and the Romans have been enemies for half a century, with the First Punic War breaking out in 264 BC and lasting until 241 BC. Rome was ultimately victorious and destroyed Carthaginian sea power, leaving a bitter taste in the mouth of the man who was to lead their army in the near future.
Hannibal took control of a Carthaginian colony in Spain as a young man, after his father passed. Alarmed and threatened by the expansion and growth of Carthage’s power in the region, the Romans offered an ultimatum to Hannibal in 219 BC, but he refused to back down. With Rome’s provocation, Hannibal got the men and support he needed from the government in Carthage to set out for revenge and war with Rome once and for all.
. . .
Sometime between late April and mid-June of 218, Hannibal departs from Carthago Nova in Spain, modern-day Cartagena (which is the main Carthaginian city in Spain). The Second Punic War has begun. He is heading toward modem-day Italy, determined to take the fight to the enemy.
Hannibal heads a motley band of Africans, Spanish, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, and Greeks. A later inscription states that Hannibal’s army consists of 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. That is undoubtedly exaggerated but probably not wildly. Regardless, it is the largest and most experienced army in the Mediterranean. His plan is to destroy Rome, not by razing it to the ground but by isolating it from its allies in the Italian Peninsula - on whom Rome is dependent because the allies contribute soldiers for the capital’s war effort.
Hannibal crosses the Pyrenees, which separate modern-day Spain from France, in July or August of 218. He now has only 50,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry left. The rest, many of them mercenaries, have abandoned him. The worst is yet to come, however.
He makes rapid progress along the French coast, facing little opposition from the local tribes. He crosses the River Rhone in September and reaches the foothills of the Alps probably in late October. Finally, he is about to undertake the most amazing part of his journey - not least, of course, because he is crossing the Alps with 37 elephants. But first his army is attacked by a hostile people called the Allobroges, who left Hannibal’s army in such wretched plight that one of his lieutenants recommended cannibalism, which he rejects.
The descent of the Alps is as difficult as the ascent. At one point, a landslide wipes out hundreds of men. Hannibal’s army is now reduced further to 12,000 African infantry, 8,000 Iberian infantry, and 6,000 cavalry - less than half the number he’d had after crossing the Pyrenees.
Despite his losses, Hannibal still has a highly effective fighting force. He proceeds to defeat the Romans at the River Ticinus in late November and at the River Trebbia in late December - both in northern Italy. Then, on June 21, 217, he ambushes a Roman army at Lake Trasimene and defeats it crushingly.
After this latest debacle, the Roman Senate appoints Quintus Fabius Maximus as dictator. And Fabius makes it his policy to avoid a head-on confrontation - hence the term “Fabian tactics.” This is an effective strategy, but public outcry of the supposed cowardly act of dodging the enemy dooms the plan. Fabius’s term of office as dictator lapses in December of 217, and the military command of the Roman army is given to two consuls with equal authority: Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus. The two consuls join forces at the end of July 216 and pursue the Carthaginian general south, intent on forcing a final showdown.
Hannibal is actually luring the Romans to Cannae, located on the south bank of the Aufidius River, modern-day Ofanto. Cannae is of considerable significance to the Romans. The Aufidius is the only major river in central Italy. The town controls access to the rich grain fields in the south, so it’s an important supply base for the Romans. It also happens to be situated in flat, open country, so it provides an excellent opportunity for Hannibal’s calvary to perform at best advantage.
Hannibal’s forces are outnumbered by more than two to one. Over the past six months, Rome has been making a supreme effort to increase its fighting strength. In fact, it has doubled the size of its army - from 20,000 to 40,000. And the total number of Rome’s army is twice that. An equal number of soldiers have been conscripted from other cities on the Italian Peninsula that are allied to Rome and required to furnish troops. But Hannibal knows that half of these troops are completely untested in battle and capable of only limited military maneuvers. He strongly suspects that the Romans expect to rely on sheer weight to crush him. In turn, Hannibal intends to win through superior tactics. He also carefully studies the temperaments of the two enemy Roman consuls - Varro and Paullus - who, according to traditional military procedure, command the joint army on alternate days when two consular armies join forces. Varro is much more eager to engage the invading enemy than Paullus is, and he is likely to be more reckless. For this reason, Hannibal decides to lure the Romans into battle on a day when Varro is in command.
On August 2, Varro accepts the challenge and leads his men out of camp with the intention of offering battle. The Romans draw their infantry up in a conventional parallel formation with their heavy calvary on the wings. They group their companies especially close together for this battle - the infantry narrow and deep - to form a battering ram aimed at Hannibal’s front lines with plans of breaking through the center. It may be Varro’s only option with many inexperienced men, and he plans to have this near impenetrable line smash and break its way through Carthaginian forces.
As the troops meet, Appian tells us it was “a great slaughter and a great struggle, each side contending valiantly.” Then the superior Carthaginian calvary attacks with such ferocity they force many Roman horsemen to dismount and fight on foot; the ones who can escape flee from the battlefield. Now the Carthaginian light calvary is able to run around the rear of the Roman army until they reach their comrades on the other wing. It is a stunning display of coordination and command. The Roman calvary now completely breaks and scatters. The infantry is all alone in the battle.
While the calvary clashed, the Roman legions were advancing, pushing the Carthaginian front back. The Carthaginians retreated carefully, changing their line from curving outwards to curving inwards. Hannibal’s entire battle plan depends on his lines bending without breaking, and to ensure morale he has himself among the most vulnerable in the middle of the fighting. In his presence, the infantry valiantly holds on - taking massive casualties - as his calvary neutralize the Roman horsemen. At this point, he springs his elite calvary wings that had been waiting and resting.
The Romans are now in trouble: their initially successful first assault on the retreating Carthaginians had distracted them from seeing that they were becoming encircled. They are now forced to abandon their advance and face waves of attacks from behind. The Carthaginians form a wall and begin the butchery of the entrapped Romans. This continues until it‘s too dark to continue the slaughter.
Livy’s description of the battle is lurid and, indeed, moving. He reports that some injured Romans bury their heads in the ground in a pathetic effort to choke themselves to death. 50,000 to 70,000 Romans are dead, and nearly 20,000 men are taken prisoner. Only 14,500 escape death or captivity. The moment is all the more delicious for Hannibal because it represents payback for his father, for himself, and for Carthage’s defeat in the First Punic War.
The Roman consul Aemilius Paullus - who a day before argued with his consular colleague Varro against confronting Hannibal in battle - is among the fallen. Hannibal gives him an honorable burial, while leaving the rest of the enemy dead on the field to rot.
Hannibal has won an outstanding victory - one of the greatest of all time - and it will be an inspiration for military strategists up to the present day.
Despite the victory against great odds, Cannae comes at considerable cost to the winner. Hannibal’s losses amount to 6,000 men - 15 percent of his forces - of whom 2,000 followed him all the way from Spain. The rest are recruits acquired along the way, most of them Gauls who attached themselves to Hannibal’s banner in the hope of acquiring rich rewards.
. . .
Immediately after the battle, the surviving consul Varro dispatches a messenger on horseback to Rome. Traveling at breakneck speed, he reaches the capital in less than 12 hours. An emergency meeting of the Senate is called. The city is in turmoil. There is a sense of overwhelming despair.
Ten prisoners are sent by Hannibal and arrive under the command of Carthaginian cavalry officer named Carthalo. They bring the offer to ransom 8,000 captives and negotiate peace terms. As soon as the Senate learns that Carthalo is outside Rome, it orders him to depart. But it allows the Roman prisoners to deliver Hannibal’s message.
The decision regarding whether to ransom the 8,000 Romans must be made quickly. The Carthaginian army will undoubtedly arrive in a few days. On the advice of a senator named Titus Manlius Torquatus, the senators vote not to ransom a single Roman prisoner. Instead, the 10 prisoners who came with Hannibal’s offer are sent back to Hannibal - and to possible death. This is a truly momentous and courageous decision, because, as Livy says, “most of the senators had relatives among the captives.”
With every minute that passes, the Roman senators hold their breath, expecting to see Hannibal on the horizon and fearing the worst. The consul Varro soon returns to Rome to make his own report to the Senate. Livy tells us that a large crowd greets him and congratulates him “for not having despaired of the Republic” - for having the courage to accept the unpleasant results rather than go into voluntary exile.
Hannibal impatiently awaits the response of the Romans, who in turn are holding their breath, fearfully awaiting his next move. This is, undoubtedly, Hannibal’s finest hour. Rome is on the ropes, and thanks to his great victory, Carthage will soon reclaim its rightful position as master of the Mediterranean - or so Hannibal believes.
When Carthalo returns to the Carthaginian camp with the news that the Romans aren’t prepared to negotiate, Hannibal is taken by surprise. He wastes no time in executing a number of prisoners, presumably the most eminent, and sells the rest into slavery. Although he does not know it, Hannibal’s finest hour is quickly receding, notwithstanding the fact that his victory will make Carthage - for a few brief years - the most powerful state in the Mediterranean. Some in Hannibal’s army must urge him to take Rome. Hannibal declines.
Still, Rome holds its breath. . .
. . .
The question as to why Hannibal fails to consolidate the victory at Cannae - by launching an immediate attack on Rome - has exercised military pundits as well as armchair historians ever since. There are a number of reasons why he might have decided that it wasn’t a particularly brilliant idea. One is that he lacks the forces to conduct a protracted siege. Siege warfare in the ancient world is long and painstaking, sometimes taking years. There is the likelihood, too, that his army will become restive. Most of his men have joined up for easy profits and aren’t the least bit interested in Rome’s fate. They’d rather pillage the countryside than besiege a city.
Rome is safe.
. . .
Learning from Hannibal’s military genius was the young Roman soldier Publius Cornelius Scipio. He was among the survivors of Cannae, and would eventually defeat Hannibal at the Battle of Zama in 202 BC - using the great Carthaginian’s own tactics against him to win the Second Punic War for Rome. Roman military skill - that rocketed them to a dominant global empire - can be traced directly back to their adaptations of Hannibal’s strategies at Cannae.
The Romans, due to their decision not to come to terms with Hannibal, will later proclaim themselves to be a people who never give in. It’s hard to argue with results.
. . .
Podcast Source:
- Hardcore History 21-23 – Punic Nightmares Series. Link here: https://www.dancarlin.com/product/hardcore-history-punic-nightmares-series/
Book Sources:
- “The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265-146BC” by Adrian Goldsworthy
- “Roman History” (Wars Against Hannibal 5) by Appian
-Livy, “The History of Rome” (Book 22: Chapters 44-52) by Livy
Pictures:
- Battle maps from Ancient.eu
- Painting from Weapons and Warfare
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