Asediul-Siracuzei! Partea-6!

 1-Dupa atacuri repetate Siracuza a cedat .

2-Doar centrul Orasului ramase necucerit .

3-Caldura mare, lipsa de hrana ,bolile au facut capitulare mai usoara .

4-Romani au stiut sa se protejeze mai bine avand si avantajul hranei si apei .

5-Marcelo a dat ordin pentru lasarea cadavrelor sa ramane in Oras .

    1-Mirosul era oribil pentru trupele-siracuzene ramanse .

    2-Trupele-Romane au mai ssteptat putin pentru ca mirosul sa isi faca efectul .

6-Cartagena a pierdut pe mare fortele pe care le-a trimis .

7-Marcelo da ordin pentru ca Orasul sa nu fie distrus .

    1-Arhimede prins in viata .

     2-Doar bogatiile sa fie puse pe Nave .

     3-Portul sa fie distrus si automat navele siracuzene .

8-Arhimede moare asasinat de trupele-romane care nu l-au recunoscut .

9-Hannibal aflase de caderea orasului si se astepta ca restul trupelor romane sa vina in Italia pentru razboi.

10-Din punctul meu de vedere in acest asediu toata Istoria il va tine mine pe Arhimede-geniul militar .

Marcus Antonius vs Parthia !-PARTEA-4!

 1-Antonius invadeaza Parthia prin Munti-Armeni dar cu o linie de aprovizionare foarte fragila .

2-Parthia ataca sistematic spatele legiunilor lui Antonius dar nu a fost la fel de usor ca in cazul lui Crassus .

3-Antoniu se retrage in Armenia pentru regrupare si alimentarea trupelor sale .

4-Antonius a cerut ajutor militar si aprovizionare de la Cleopatra .

5-Antonius culmea face o greseala tactica !

       1-Octavian ii trimite legiunile promise in schimbul navelor pe care le-a dat Antonius .

6-Antonius respinge aceste trupe !

7-Antonius cucereste Armenia in 34-I-HR .

8-A continuat campania din Partthia dar fara mare succes .

9-Antonius isi stabileste baza principala in Alexandria lui Cleopatra .

10-Pot spune ca Antonius a pierdut razboiul din Parthia dar putea oricand sa se intoarca acolo cu trupe mai odihnite si numeric logic .

11-Parthia numai reprezenta prioritatea lui Antonius .

12-Razboiul Civil cu Octavian si Senatul Roman devenea prioritatea sa nr-1.

Asediul-Siracuzei! Partea-5!

 1-Marcelo nu reuseste nici acum sa cucereasca Siracuza .

2-Siracuza reuseste sa reziste inca 3 luni .

3-Hannibal reuseste sa trimeata hrana in Siracuza .

4-Sansa a aparut cum am zis in ultima parte !

    1-Spionii si atragerea populatiei de partea-Romei .

5-Marcelo impreuna cu 1000 de soldati reuseste sa intre in Siracuza .

6-Siracuzeni se retrag spre centrul Orasului unde puteau sa lupte mai bine !

    1-Spantiul era strans iar legiunile nu puteau sa lupte cum dorea .

7-Cartaginezi trimit din nou intariri .

    1-Acum trupe putine si vase de lupta care nu puteau sa reziste luptei cu Roma .

8-Populatia infometata era pe zi ce trece de partea-Romei .

9-Marcelo infrange Trupele-Cartageneze pe mare si odata cu lucrul asta taie orice fel de ajutor pentru Siracuza .

10-Roma arata cum spionajul perfect poate aduce o asa victorie .

Asediul-Siracuzei! Partea-4!

 1-Aceste metode de aparare pe care le-a inventat Arhimede puteau fi folosite  si impotriva trupelor-romane terestre .

2-Cucerirea Siracuzei devenea tot mai grea pentru Roma .

3-Marcelo punea la punct noi strategi pentru atac !

     1-Blocaj total terestru .

     2-Nimeni numai intra in Siracuza fara acordul-romanilor .

     3-Atacuri navale bazate pe distanta .

      4-Bile uriase de foc si sulite care erau aruncate dupa nave.

      5-Navele nu se mai apropiau de zidurile Siracuzei .

4-Cartagena intervine .

     1- Hannibal il trimite pe Generalul-Imelanu .

     2-Ajutor in trupe si nave .

5-Generalul-Roman-Marcelo era dispera dar nu isi pierdea luciditatea .

6-Senatul il presa pentru cucerirea Siracuzei  .

    1-Hannibal inca era un mare pericol in Italia .

    2-Roma avea nevoie de aceste trupe .

7-Marcelo se gandeste la urmatoarea strategie .

      1-A trimis spioni in Siracuza care sa atraga poporul de partea-Romei .

8-Hannibal incerca sa ocupe Siracuza sau sa ajute pentru iesirea la Mediterana .

       1-Roma a fost prima si aici .

        2-Roma considera ca Hannibal a aratat mult tupeu  prin interventia in aceasta lupta .

        3-Marcelo era in contact cu Familia-Scipio .

9-Siracuza trimite dupa ajutor in Macedonia !

      1-Roma prinde generalul-siracuzan care s-a dus dupa ajutor .

      2-Roma pune trupe peste tot !Nici un generral siracuzan era impiedicat sa plece dupa ajutor .

10-Marcelo mai arata inca o dovada de inteligenta .

     1-Pune un soldat-roman imbract in Siracuzan si il trimite in Oras .

     2-Acest soldat-roman da sperante false !

     3-Un presupus ajutor din Macedonia urma sa vina in Siracuza .

Asediul-Siracuzei! Partea-3!

 1-Atac-terestru si naval !

2-Generalul Pulca urma sa conduca atacul-terestru asupra-Seracuzei .

3-Romani folosesc masini de asalt atat naval cat si pe pamant .

4-Marcelus avea 70-nave de razboi .

5-Marcelus avea un ace sub maneca .

    1-Sambuca-un fel de catafrag care permitea debarcarea trupelor direct pe uscat dupa nave sau pe alte nave de razboi .

    2-Un avantaj enorm pentru trupele navale .

6-Siracuza se baza pe geniul lui Arhimede .

7-Arhimede era Siracuzan .

8-Pune in practica cateva metode de aparare impotriva Romanilor!Metode care l-a facut pe Arhimede un geniul .

       1-Arme de lansare .

       2-Un varf de lance care avea ca scop distrugerea Navelor-Romane sau provocarea unor daune grave .

       3-Un carlig care sa permita ridicarea navelor si scufundarea !

       4-Acest carlig era manevrat foarte usor dupa zidurile Siracuzei de un grup de soldati .

9-Arhimede mai arata o noua arma de aparare .

      1-Structura metalica cu care puteau scufunda navele de razboi romane si aici ma refer la partea de jos !

     2-Un fel de cap de berbec-naval .

10-Marcelo a ramas uimit de aceste metode si de geniul lui Arhimede .

              

Simon-Bolivar -Partea 3!

 1-Se duce si in Anglia unde dorea sa invete noi metode de lupta .

2-Miranda era un general slab si aici ma refer la intelect si in lupta .

3-In 1812-Revolta numai se afla pe mana lui Miranda .

4-Miranda este prins si inchis de Bolivar .

5-Bolivar incepe un proces de inarmare  agresiva pentru trupele sale .

       1-Aici ma refer la arme noi .

       2-Multe din ele cumparate din Anglia .

6-Bolivar atrage trupe noi din randul agricultorilor care suferau enorm din cauza Spaniolilor .

7-In 1812 conducea-Armatele in Magdalena si Rosario .

8-Distruge fortele-Spaniole aflate in acele-Orase .

9-Invadeaza Venezuela si o elibereaza .

10-Foloseste lupta de gherila in Venezuela si nu a dat gres .

Asediul-Siracuzei! Partea-2!

 1-Cei 2 frati si anume-Elicide si Ipocrite conduc Siracuza impotriva Romei .

2-Cei 2 organizeaza un razboi total contra Romei .

3-Siracuza ataca orasul Leonemi -si mai precis Garnizoana -Romana de acolo .

4-Se dorea un razboi scurt !

       1-Se cunoastea disciplina-Romana  in razboi .

5-Legiunile-Romane se intorc in Italia pentru regrupare .

6-Razboiul era total !. 

    1-Siracuza acuza Roma de  brutalitat excesiva .

    2-Roma dorea anexare totala a Siracuzei .

7-Generalul Roman-Marcelus pregatea asediul Siracuzei .

8-Siracuza era aparata de 27 km-ziduri protectoare .

9-Roma a incercat sa asigure ca Siracuza nu primeste ajutor din partea lui Hannibal .

10-Marcelo dorea ca asediul sa fie dat  din 2-parti .

 

Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-39!

 1-Acest articol este copiat !

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

"A robin red-breast in a cage, puts all of Heaven in a rage. Think to yourself that every day is your last. The hour to which you do not look forward will come as a welcome surprise. As for me, when you want a good laugh, you will find me in fine state... fat and sleek, a true hog of Epicurus's herd."

214 BC saw wave after wave of Celtiberian tribes abandon Carthage following recent reverses at Ebro River at Ibera. The Scipios continued to build up their support base, while Hasdrubal looked to used Punic gold to rebuild his own Iberian army. Carthage’s situation in the Second Punic War deteriorated further the following year, with the Numidian king and ally Syphax declaring for Rome. Numidia (modern Tunisia and part of Morocco) was a powerful kingdom, and the source of Hannibal’s vaunted cavalry – though given the technological limitations at the time, there was obviously no way to strip him of his horse, even if they had wished to support their king rather than their general. Rome dispatched advisors and veterans to Numidia to help train the forces of Syphax and embolden him to make war on Carthage. A pro-Carthaginian movement erupted in Sardinia in 213 BC, but this was quickly quelled by the Romans, who still maintained naval supremacy.

In Sicily, a large Carthaginian army landed under the command of Himilco landed to support Syracuse. His 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry swiftly overran tracts of the island, including the old Punic stronghold of Agrigentum, and harried the legions under Marcellus which were besieging Syracuse. The change in fortune saw numerous towns now either expel or massacre their Roman garrisons as it appeared Carthage was on the cusp of regaining the island that it had occupied for centuries before the First Punic War. Rome responded violently to these, with atrocities including the sack of Enna after a dispute escalated over who should have the town key – the Romans, or the townspeople. A heated confrontation erupted when a townsman threw a fig at a military tribune, who then lit the fuse that saw the legionaries tear through the city and turn it to rubble. As with most sacks of cities, men, children and the elderly were all killed indiscriminately, and in brutal ways, while women were horrifically raped and murdered, the streets left slick with blood. It has long been a tragedy of war that the greatest price is often paid by those lowly civilians who have so little say in how it is run.

Despite Himilco’s success, he failed to resupply the beleaguered Syracuse, and were soon hamstrung by plague. It is oft forgotten that disease can be a soldier’s greatest enemy, even in modern times – malaria killed more US soldiers in Vietnam than the Vietcong did. When disease set in, the cramped conditions of a military camp could make its effects devastating. In an age of superstition and omens, it could also cripple morale and been interpreted as a punishment from the gods, particularly impacting a state like Carthage that relied on mercenary armies.

In 212 BC, the Roman siege of Syracuse finally bore fruit. A naval blockade had failed due to the contraptions of Archimedes, and thus the city had kept supplied by sea despite the legions being encamped outside the walls. An eagle-eyed legionary saw that one section of the wall was lower than appeared, and thus when the Syracusians had a festival, the legionaries approached near daybreak, scaled the low wall and opened the gates. The sack of Syracuse that followed would have been another horrific scene of war, a magnified version of Enna on a much larger scale. Greeks awoke with throbbing heads from their handovers to the confused sound of trumpets, which they did not use, only to realise that the legions were already within the city. Many rushed to their homes for their families, being cut down on the way as they made a desperate last stand. The legionaries hunted through houses in search of plunder and women, and in such a bitter war, mercy was in short supply. Several districts of the city were captured, though a number of citizens managed to secure themselves inside the citadel. Orders had been given before entering the city for Archimedes to be spared so Rome could benefit from his genius, but when he haughtily dismissed the man entering his room assuming he was a rude apprentice interrupting, and not realising that he was in fact a legionary, he was cut down. Syracuse final capitulated fully in Autumn 212 BC, ending 500 years of independence.

In Italy, Fabius the Delayer was able to overrun the Punic ally of Arpi in 213 BC, returning a defector to the Roman fold and building on the capture of Casilinum a year earlier. Rome had been holding regular riads to harass Capua, the main city which had defected, and in 212 BC the Consuls Appius Claudius and Fulvius Flaccus moved to besiege the city with eight legions. Two years before had seen a Roman success against Hannibal’s adjutant Hanno, whereby two ‘slave legions’ – promised their freedom upon victory – augmented the existing couple of legions to annihilate a force of 18,000 at the Battle of Beneventum, preventing Hannibal from successfully campaigning in Campania. Now Hanno moved to relieve Capua, but after his foragers were attacked he was forced to retire, and the citizens then sought aid directly from Hannibal.

Hannibal sent 2,000 Numidian cavalry to reinforce the city, and while the Romans called on Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus to support the siege, he was ambushed on route and killed, his death causing the dispersal of his army. The Numidians raided the Roman camp and won numerous skirmishes while Hannibal camped east of the city, proffering battle three days later. The Battle of Capua was a long, drawn-out affair, but again the Numidians showed their superiority to the Roman horse. Seeing cavalry approach from the south, both armies retired to their camps. The Romans decided to split their armies and withdraw from Capua, lifting the siege. Flaccus moved towards Cumae, and Claudius to Lucania, with Hannibal in pursuit. Having lifted the siege, Hannibal then moved to besiege Brundisium, though this allowed the legions to resume the siege of Capua in his absence. Neither side had gained advantage, but now Hannibal had two more Roman armies in his sights.

Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-38!

 1-Acest articol este copiat !

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

“For although the Romans had clearly been defeated in the field, and their reputation in arms ruined, yet because of the singularity of their constitution, and by wisdom of their deliberative counsel, they not only reclaimed the sovereignty of Italy, and went on to conquer the Carthaginians, but in just a few years became the rulers of the entire world.” (Polybius)

By 215 BC, the Second Punic War was spreading across the Mediterranean as the Romans looked to avoid direct conflict with Hannibal after his third crushing victory, at Cannae. In Iberia, Scipio the Elder had returned after the defeat at Trebia and commanded the four Roman legions there alongside his brother, Gnaeus Scipio. They had defeated the naval commander Himilco in a battle at the River Ebro estuary, and now faced Hannibal’s middle brother Hasdrubal looking to rally the Celtiberian tribes to the Carthaginian cause, too wary of their loyalty to leave the peninsula for Italy. In Italy, Hannibal was still an occupying force as the Roman adopted the scorched earth Fabian Strategy, concentrating their legions on defecting towns like Capua and Tarentum. In Sicily, Syracuse’s new king had declared for Carthage, and following a disastrous initial naval assault, the legions dug in for a seemingly futile siege.

The Scipios in Hispania finally forced Hasdrubal to battle following their crossing of the Ebro to besiege Ibera (later known as Dertosa Ilercavonia, modern Tortosa). Both armies had around 25,000 men, the Romans having two of their own and two Italian allied legions, along with local recruits, while Hasdrubal’s army was largely Celtiberian recruits, and complemented by 21 war elephants. The Romans had their legions in the centre and the allies on the flanks, protected by the cavalry, while the Punic forces had the Celtiberians in the centre and the African veterans on the flanks, with cavalry flanking them. Balearic slingers formed a screen in front of the elephants.

Forty years previously some 13,000 Roman legions had been scattered in terror by a hundred elephants at the Battle of Tunis in the First Punic War, but Rome had long since conquered its fear of the terrifying beasts. A trained war elephant would still be a horrifying prospect, often fighting in musk and trained to use its feet, trunks, and steel encase tusks to kill, but they were also vulnerable. The mahouts commanding them were horribly exposed, the elephants could be panicked by loud noises, unfamiliar smells, and missile weapons, and once spooked, they were often as much a threat to their own infantry as the enemy. Hasdrubal’s elephants were thus swiftly dealt with, and the Roman legions in the centre marched on the Celtiberians facing them. Following an initial and brief exchange of javelins, the Iberians fled on first contact. They knew Hasdrubal was looking to win to march in support of his brother, and these local troops had no desire to march far from home to campaign in Italy. This, coupled with the ever-daunting prospect of facing Roman legionaries, made the battle somewhat of a farce as the centre of the Punic line disintegrated. Hasdrubal had heard how Hannibal’s Celtiberians and Gauls had done an excellent job of managing a slow, feigned retreat with the centre of their line at Cannae the year before, so was shocked when his own troops routed with barely a sword thrust at them. These men were already in Italy though, and had already enjoyed a string of successes under the eldest son of the lion’s brood.

The Roman legions now piled through the centre of the Punic formation. Neither side’s cavalry gained an advantage in their skirmishing. The African veterans attempted to turn and face the flanks of the Roman legions, but still faced the Italian allies at their front. The Romans held their formation rather than pursuing the Celtiberians, and now managed to envelop the Carthaginian flanks. The Africans put up a stout resistance, and the Romans suffered many casualties, but their cause was hopeless. The remaining Carthaginian cavalry and elephants fled with Hasdrubal, and the legions looted their camp, capturing the provisions, equipment and treasury. The town of Ibera surrendered to Rome, while the remnants of the shattered Punic army made their way back to Cartagena.

Losses on both sides had been heavy, though Roman victory now left the Scipios firmly established in north-east Hispania, crucially blocking the overland route to Hannibal in Italy. There was no immediate campaign launched against the remaining Punic possessions, rather the Roman strategy of raids, building up a power base, and winning the support of Celtiberian tribes continued. Italy was still suffering the ramifications of Cannae, and as glorious as victory as Ibera was, Rome simply did not have to men or resources to reinforce Hispania and build on it. Twice the Scipios complained to the Senate of lack of support, but still none was forthcoming.

Victory did, however, turn the attention of Carthage. Hannibal’s youngest brother Mago had returned to Carthage following Cannae, to both proclaim his success and press the case for reinforcements to complete the conquest of Rome. He raised an army which was due to land at Locri and support Hannibal, though news of Ibera and declining influence in Hispania – which Carthage relied on for silver ore and other resources – spooked the merchant state. This army was instead rerouted to Iberia, with victory not only preventing the Celtiberian tribes from abandoning Rome, but also now causing a Punic support army to head to that peninsula instead of Italy. Rome may not have been able to withstand the pressure of a second Carthaginian army led by another of the lion’s brood. While easily overlooked, Ibera may well have been the battle that turned the tide of the Second Punic War. Despite this victory, there was still much fighting to be done, and much blood to be shed, as the war would continue raging across the Mediterranean.

Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-37!

 1-Acest articol este copiat !

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

"I have come not to make war on the Italians, but to aid the Italians against Rome."

Rome’s attention in the Second Punic War reverted after the disaster at Cannae back to the Fabian Strategy, isolating Hannibal while focussing their efforts on defectors to him. Hannibal’s biggest win had been the Campanian city of Capua, harbouring hopes of becoming Italy’s leading city under Carthaginian suzerainty, and he wintered his army there in 216 BC. Rome was finally smiled upon by Fortuna when a random search by its ships found a proposed treaty of alliance from Philip V of Macedon to Hannibal. Seeking to capitalise on the defeat at Cannae, and use it as an opportunity to drive the legions out of Illyria, this alliance could have operated as a pincer movement to attack Italia from both Iberia and Greece, with Hannibal optimistic of receiving the supplies and reinforcements needed from his new ally to finally crush Rome. In reality, this sparked the First Macedonian War which saw excellent Roman diplomacy forge alliances of anti-Macedonian Greeks – the Aetolian League – to do most of their fighting for them, against Philip and his Achaean League. Despite the threat from Hannibal in Italy, Rome would recall neither it Iberian or Illyrian legions. While the First Macedonian War would be inconclusive and end with a negotiated peace in 205 BC, Rome’s fury against Philip would trigger a series of wars in the decade to follow that would annihilate Macedon, crush the phalanx, and see all of Greece annexed to the Roman Republic.

In Sicily Hiero II, the elderly tyrant who had ruled for 45 years and declared for Rome in the First Punic War, died in 215 BC. His successor Hieronymus was not content with Roman supremacy, and negotiated terms with Hannibal which would see Syracuse lay claim to all of Sicily. Syracuse had a powerful navy, and now proffered Carthage the chance to reinforce Hannibal directly – something Rome could not tolerate, and thus move to besiege the city. The Greek city of Syracuse had already enjoyed around 500 years of independence as the leading state in Magna Graecia, and its stubborn resistance against Athens in defeating two expeditionary forces had seen them lose the Peloponnesian War two centuries earlier.

Now Syracuse stood opposed to Rome, but instead of a Spartan general causing the legions grief, it would be a mathematician and scientist. Archimedes’ inventions included the screw, which could carry water uphill and thus drain ships while at sea, and allegedly a series of mirrors within a lighthouse that could turn sunlight into a deadly beam to burn ships. He famously shouted “Eureka!” and ran through the streets naked when he got in the bath and understood the physics of water displacement. Rome’s initial attack against Syracuse was to be by the sea, outfitting a fleet of triremes with scaling ladders and siege tower – which inevitably made the ships unwieldy – and using these to scale the sea walls of the city. Along with its deadly missile arsenal of onagars and ballistae, Syracuse would answer this threat with on of Archimedes’ most infamous inventions – the claw.

The Archimedes claw essentially had a long wooden arm that would hang over the side of the wall and be lowered into the sea, with a hook at the end. This hook would then hook onto the ram of the trireme, and then use counterweights at the opposite end of the arm to lift them vertically out of the water. Once lifted sufficiently, the ship would be dropped to plunge into the sea, ruined. In an age where most of those aboard the ships were clad in heavy armour to scale the walls, and few of them could swim even without armour, the death tolls on ships that were picked up by the claw was catastrophic. Those on board also had to face a constant hail of arrows, bolts, lead shot and stones, making easy targets for the defenders on the tightly packed decks where survival was but a lottery. Very few scaled the walls, and those that did were swiftly cut down. Rome’s first attempt to take Syracuse was a complete failure, and the legions now dug in for a siege. Given the strength of the Syracusion fleet though there was little they could do to blockade the city, and thus the siege was rather fruitless as the city could resupply by sea. Maintaining the siege, the legions under Marcellus (who had previously defeated the Gallic king in single combat) instead focussed on asserting their strength throughout the rest of the island, and preventing other defections.

In Iberia, Hasdrubal Barca was ordered by Carthage to move to Italy to support Hannibal, but did not feel confident enough in local support to abandon Iberia. Punic reverses caused the tribes to defect to Rome – the opposite of the Italian situation. Having quelled the Turdetani uprising, Hasdrubal left Himilco at Cartagena while he marched inland to reassert Punic authority. In early 215 BC, the Romans crossed the Ebro in force and besieged Ibera (later known as Dertosa Ilercavonia, modern Tortosa). Hasdrubal responded by besieging a pro-Roman town, and thus the Scipios lifted their siege to engage him.

Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-36!

 1-Acest articol este copiat !

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

"Of a truth the gods do not give the same man everything: you know how to gain a victory, Hannibal, but you do not know how to make use of it."

Hannibal Barca’s brother Mago returned to Carthage following his decisive victory at Cannae in 216 BC. He gloated to the Senate that Hannibal – who was essentially a rogue general, acting without the state’s authorisation in invading Italy, and only ostensibly supported by them in principle to avoid admitting this – had slain 200,000 soldiers, imprisoned 50,000, killed two Consuls and a Master of Horse, and caused the defection of many Roman allies. He then poured a bag full of gold rings onto the floor, explaining that each belong to a Roman equite (knight) who had been killed.

In Rome, the government seemed to be buckling. There was panic on the streets, with everyone having a dead relative from the massacre at Cannae, and barely enough Senators left to properly govern. Now the aristocrats looked to their own safety as they foresaw Hannibal’s siege. Lucius Caecilius Metellus and three other military tribunes, who had taken refuge at Canusium with other Roman refugees, spoke of seeking employment abroad as mercenaries. Scipio the Younger, with a minimal following, strode into the chamber and held a sword above their heads, declaring: “I swear with all the passion in my heart that I will never desert our homeland, or permit any other citizen of Rome to leave her in the lurch. If I wilfully break my oath may Jupiter, Greatest and Best, bring me to a shameful death, with my house, my family, and all I possess! Swear the same oath, Caecilius! And the rest of you, swear it too. If anyone refuse, against him this sword is drawn.”

The commander of the Numidian cavalry, Maharbal, urged Hannibal to immediately marched on Rome. The Punic general refused. Maharbal bemoaned: "Of a truth the gods do not give the same man everything: you know how to gain a victory, Hannibal, but you do not know how to make use of it." Despite criticism of this decision, it is worth noting that Rome still had a huge population, and even know measures were being taken to raise a defensive force, such as dropping the land requirements for legionaries and freeing slaves to serve in the army. Hannibal’s force was both battle weary and had suffered heavy losses in victory, so it is difficult to envisage how an army around 40,000 strong could – without serious reinforcement from its new allies – besiege a city of a million people. The English King Edward III would face the same problem in the Hundred Year’s War when the French chose to remain in Paris following comprehensive battlefield defeats at Crecy and Poitiers. Not only did Hannibal lack siege equipment, but a fruitless assault on the city would have likely reduced the psychological affect of Cannae on the citizens of Rome. Rome could still mobilise the manpower of Iberia, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and Illyria to complement that still left in Italy, and Hannibal thus needed to remain mobile, rather than being bogged down in a siege. His aim was to break up Rome’s alliance of Italian states – and this strategy was at last bearing fruit.

A delegation under Carthalo arrived to proffer moderate peace terms to the Senate. Rome was beaten, and Hannibal expected them to accept. Despite the repeated catastrophes, the Senate refused to even meet with such a delegation while Hannibal occupied Italy. There would be no ransom for the prisoners of Cannae – those fortunate families who knew they had a relative who had been captured were now told that their city would not pay for their release. One of the hardest parts to imagine for the families of the losers of any battle is the uncertainty of the fate of their loved ones. The word “peace” was prohibited from mourning for 30 days, and only women allowed to cry in public. The fortunate survivors of Cannae were barred from returning to Rome for the shame, their legions remaining mobilised and sent to Sicily. Such was the lot of the poor citizen soldier, who played no part in the strategic decisions of the battle but had to suffer to consequences of those decisions by essentially being separated from their homes and families.

Never in the rest of the war would Rome raise such a large army in Italy. Instead they would adopt a policy of flexibility, with numerous independent armies acting in concert to shadow Hannibal, refuse battle, and concentrate upon the various defecting cities. The much-resented Fabian Strategy was now welcomed, and towns were now fortified to prevent Hannibal from capturing them. Despite a growing alliance, Carthage’s new supporters felt little sense of community with Carthage, much less with each other. These cities provided few new troops for Hannibal, and merely hampered him with more points that he needed to defend. Those troops that did support Hannibal were loath to campaign away from their city, and performed poorly when they did. Capua’s reason for defecting was little more than an opportunistic grab to become the leading city in Italy if Hannibal were to ultimately triumph. When the port of Locri defected the following year, Carthage immediately resupplied Hannibal with soldiers, supplies and war elephants – though this was the only time in the war that Hannibal would be resupplied by his motherland. Rome continued its recovery – there were 12 legions in the field early the following year, 18 by 214 BC, 22 by 213 BC, and over 100,000 Romans, and a similar number of allies, by 212 BC. Now the war would shift away from Italy, with Hannibal left frustrated as Rome focussed on Sicily, Iberia, and Illyria.

Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-35!

 1-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

2-Acest articol este copiat !

Darkness over Cannae

“Never, except when Rome itself had once been captured, was there so much terror and confusion within the walls. I shall confess that I am unequal to the task of narration, and will not attempt to provide a full description, which would only fall short of the truth.” (Livy)

With a huge force of 80,000 legionaries – double the size of the Carthaginian infantry – it is difficult to envisage how they could have lost. Despite its size, the Consul Varro had chosen to have a deep line, rather than a long one. Thus instead of outflanking the Carthaginian army, his line either matched, or was slightly shorter, than theirs. Hannibal’s false retreat of the centre had caused the Roman line to pile into the centre, allowing his smaller force to surround the much larger Roman army. The Romans never had more than 2,000 men facing the Carthaginian line at any one time, and although the formation was 35 – 50 ranks deep, this counted for nought once the forward momentum war arrested. Now the numbers worked against the legions, with them pressed together into a crush and unable to draw their swords.

Despite encircling the Roman force, there could be no quick massacre. This was an age without gas, guns and bombs, and so all of the killing of this huge host would have to be done by hand – and at great risk to the Carthaginians. Some 6,000 Carthaginians would die in achieving the victory, a huge cost to Hannibal’s army that is often overlooked in the context of this comprehensive victory. This was not the classic case of breaking an enemy and then cutting them down as they ran – this was encircling and then massacring them. Once the encirclement was complete, up to 600 Romans would die every minute. This would be the highest kill-per-minute ratio of any battle until the Battle of the Somme some 2,133 years later. There would be 30,000 gallons of blood spilt. Polybius gave the Roman dead at 70,000, with 10,000 captured and 3,000 survivors, with only 370 survivors from the Roman cavalry. Livy gives 45,500 dead infantry and 2,700 dead cavalry, with 3,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry captured, plus 2,000 fugitives at the village of Cannae, 7,000 captured at the smaller legionary camp and 5,800 at the larger. The Consul Paullus – who had wanted to withhold battle – was among the dead, although he co-Consul Varro escaped. Also among the senior soldiers to perish were two quaestors, 29 of the 48 military tribunes, including the previous year’s Consul Geminus, and 80 Senators. For many of those trapped in the centre of the giant crush, there was little they could do besides wait to die. With their arms pinned to their sides, their heads made easy targets for Punic javelins. Many fell on their swords, knowing death was their only escape. Many dug holes and buried their heads in the ground. When the Carthaginian soldiers waded through the battlefield, exhausted survivors and the wounded merely presented their necks to them. Darkness would be their only escape.

Only 14,000 Romans would escape from the field, including Scipio the Younger who broke out of the encirclement with 500 men and made it to the town of Canusium. This was a catastrophic loss for Rome – the death of a generation. It was also crippling for the government, so many from ruling positions being killed on the field. It is impossible to imagine what this would have looked like, much less how an ancient society – when populations are far smaller than modern times – could cope with such a loss. This was a plain with the equivalent of a large sports stadium of corpses, the sky dark with crows, the air filled with the buzzing of flies, the air having the metallic taste of blood. This was more dead in one day than the US lost in the entire Vietnam War.

Cannae would become one of the greatest defeats in Rome’s history, and a brilliant piece of military strategy that generals to this day attempt to emulate in surrounding and annihilating an enemy army – including in the Gulf War. Napoleon was critical of Hannibal for employing so risky a tactic, stating that a smaller army should never seek to encircle a larger one as he became an advocate of overwhelming opponents, stating: “Quantity has a quality all of its own.” Despite this, Cannae would be the zenith of Hannibal’s campaign – the rest of the Second Punic War would never see his army reaching such dizzying successes.

It is difficult to understand how the Roman Republic could not have merely folded after Cannae. Most civilisations could take one heavy hit, and then would have to sue for peace. Rome had now taken three, and yet still refused to surrender. Alexander had defeated the Achaemenid Empire three times before it fell, and now the Roman Republic, which controlled far less territory, was persevering after similar setbacks. It displayed its trademark belligerence, digging in to prolong the war. Just as the allies sought to avoid fighting Napoleon directly, so too would the Romans now avoid Hannibal.

Hannibal was perhaps somewhat naïve in thinking Rome could be utterly defeated on the battlefield, for Italy still had huge manpower resources. There were 325,000 men in Italy when Hannibal invaded, with 250,000 of those of fighting age. That number would continue to swell, and the 17 years of fighting after Caesar crossed the Rubicon saw 420,000 Italians fighting. Rome would raise an average of two legions per year after Cannae, though Hannibal’s plan of getting the Italian allies also started the bear fruit. News of the devastating defeat shocked Italy, and many began to question whether it would be Carthage, rather than Rome, which would be the dominant power on the peninsula. Despite all this, the option of “joining” Carthage was never particularly enticing. Rome still has restrictive citizenship, but franchised far more people than Carthage did. Rome had taken the Greek concept of “polis” and advanced it to “natio”, and its allies could see how they could climb the ladder to become more involved with the republic, and ultimately become Roman themselves.

In the short term, Rome was in complete disarray. The best legions of Italy were destroyed, and the remnants utterly demoralised. Rome declared a national day of mourning, and there was not a single person in the city without a relative among the dead. Twice the Romans resorted to the abhorrent practice of human sacrifice, burying people alive in the Forum and abandoning an oversized baby in the Adriatic – the last instance of human sacrifice in Rome. In three campaigning seasons, Rome had lost a fifth of the entre male population of over 17s, with 150,000 of them dead. Most of southern Italy now defected to Carthage, with Capua and Tarentum among two of the largest cities to renounce their allegiance to Rome. Livy noted: “How much more serious was the defeat of Cannae than those which preceded it, can be seen by the behaviour of Rome's allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they despaired of Roman power.” Sicily’s Greek cities rose in revolt, while Philip V of Macedon proposed an alliance with Hannibal, to essentially flank Italy. The new King of Syracus, Hieronymus – the only independent city on the island – declared for Hannibal. The road to Rome now lay open. It seemed only a matter of when, not if, Hannibal would besiege the defenceless city, and finally crush the Roman Republic to avenge Carthage’s loss in the First Punic War.