Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-36!

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2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

"Of a truth the gods do not give the same man everything: you know how to gain a victory, Hannibal, but you do not know how to make use of it."

Hannibal Barca’s brother Mago returned to Carthage following his decisive victory at Cannae in 216 BC. He gloated to the Senate that Hannibal – who was essentially a rogue general, acting without the state’s authorisation in invading Italy, and only ostensibly supported by them in principle to avoid admitting this – had slain 200,000 soldiers, imprisoned 50,000, killed two Consuls and a Master of Horse, and caused the defection of many Roman allies. He then poured a bag full of gold rings onto the floor, explaining that each belong to a Roman equite (knight) who had been killed.

In Rome, the government seemed to be buckling. There was panic on the streets, with everyone having a dead relative from the massacre at Cannae, and barely enough Senators left to properly govern. Now the aristocrats looked to their own safety as they foresaw Hannibal’s siege. Lucius Caecilius Metellus and three other military tribunes, who had taken refuge at Canusium with other Roman refugees, spoke of seeking employment abroad as mercenaries. Scipio the Younger, with a minimal following, strode into the chamber and held a sword above their heads, declaring: “I swear with all the passion in my heart that I will never desert our homeland, or permit any other citizen of Rome to leave her in the lurch. If I wilfully break my oath may Jupiter, Greatest and Best, bring me to a shameful death, with my house, my family, and all I possess! Swear the same oath, Caecilius! And the rest of you, swear it too. If anyone refuse, against him this sword is drawn.”

The commander of the Numidian cavalry, Maharbal, urged Hannibal to immediately marched on Rome. The Punic general refused. Maharbal bemoaned: "Of a truth the gods do not give the same man everything: you know how to gain a victory, Hannibal, but you do not know how to make use of it." Despite criticism of this decision, it is worth noting that Rome still had a huge population, and even know measures were being taken to raise a defensive force, such as dropping the land requirements for legionaries and freeing slaves to serve in the army. Hannibal’s force was both battle weary and had suffered heavy losses in victory, so it is difficult to envisage how an army around 40,000 strong could – without serious reinforcement from its new allies – besiege a city of a million people. The English King Edward III would face the same problem in the Hundred Year’s War when the French chose to remain in Paris following comprehensive battlefield defeats at Crecy and Poitiers. Not only did Hannibal lack siege equipment, but a fruitless assault on the city would have likely reduced the psychological affect of Cannae on the citizens of Rome. Rome could still mobilise the manpower of Iberia, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and Illyria to complement that still left in Italy, and Hannibal thus needed to remain mobile, rather than being bogged down in a siege. His aim was to break up Rome’s alliance of Italian states – and this strategy was at last bearing fruit.

A delegation under Carthalo arrived to proffer moderate peace terms to the Senate. Rome was beaten, and Hannibal expected them to accept. Despite the repeated catastrophes, the Senate refused to even meet with such a delegation while Hannibal occupied Italy. There would be no ransom for the prisoners of Cannae – those fortunate families who knew they had a relative who had been captured were now told that their city would not pay for their release. One of the hardest parts to imagine for the families of the losers of any battle is the uncertainty of the fate of their loved ones. The word “peace” was prohibited from mourning for 30 days, and only women allowed to cry in public. The fortunate survivors of Cannae were barred from returning to Rome for the shame, their legions remaining mobilised and sent to Sicily. Such was the lot of the poor citizen soldier, who played no part in the strategic decisions of the battle but had to suffer to consequences of those decisions by essentially being separated from their homes and families.

Never in the rest of the war would Rome raise such a large army in Italy. Instead they would adopt a policy of flexibility, with numerous independent armies acting in concert to shadow Hannibal, refuse battle, and concentrate upon the various defecting cities. The much-resented Fabian Strategy was now welcomed, and towns were now fortified to prevent Hannibal from capturing them. Despite a growing alliance, Carthage’s new supporters felt little sense of community with Carthage, much less with each other. These cities provided few new troops for Hannibal, and merely hampered him with more points that he needed to defend. Those troops that did support Hannibal were loath to campaign away from their city, and performed poorly when they did. Capua’s reason for defecting was little more than an opportunistic grab to become the leading city in Italy if Hannibal were to ultimately triumph. When the port of Locri defected the following year, Carthage immediately resupplied Hannibal with soldiers, supplies and war elephants – though this was the only time in the war that Hannibal would be resupplied by his motherland. Rome continued its recovery – there were 12 legions in the field early the following year, 18 by 214 BC, 22 by 213 BC, and over 100,000 Romans, and a similar number of allies, by 212 BC. Now the war would shift away from Italy, with Hannibal left frustrated as Rome focussed on Sicily, Iberia, and Illyria.