1-Acest articol este copiat !
2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.
"I am not carrying on a war of extermination against the Romans. I am contending for honour and empire. My ancestors yielded to Roman valour. I am endeavouring that others, in their turn, will be obliged to yield to my good fortune, and my valour."
In Hispania, the Roman legions under Scipio the Elder had landed in 218 BC after the Consul left them to return to Italia when he realised Hannibal’s army was already on the march. Hannibal had conquered all of coastal Iberia on his march to Italia, and this hegemony was challenged by the arriving four legions under Gnaeus Scipio. Hanno hastily mustered some 11,000 soldiers to challenge the legions at the Battle of Cissa, but was easily defeated as he was heavily outnumbered, and lost around 6,000 soldiers. The Romans captured his camp, including the baggage left by Hannibal, stormed the town of Cissa, and took Hanno and the chieftain Indibilis captive.
Hannibal’s younger brother (the middle of three) Hasdrubal arrived in Iberia too late to support the battle, but still managed to cross the River Ebro and launch a raid with light infantry and cavalry. The Roman foragers were caught unawares, and losses were so heavy that only 35 of 60 ships could be manned. This fleet still raided Punic possessions in Iberia, and the Ilergetes tribe began raiding Roman supporters. Gnaeus wintered at Tarraco while Hasdrubal retired to Cartagena, both armies now entrenched, with Carthage in the south and Rome in the north. While Carthaginian power grew as they sought tribal alliances, the overland route to Hannibal was now cut off by Rome. Gnaeus took time to consolidate his holdings and befriend or subjugate the local tribes to ensure that Rome had a powerful base in Iberia.
In Italia, having spent the Winter resting in Cisalpine Gaul, Hannibal Barca marched his army south in Spring 217 BC. They took a difficult but unguarded route to central Italy, crossing the huge marsh at the mouth of the River Arno. The difficult marsh was overflowing, and Hannibal’s army marched through an “underwater” land for three days and nights, suffering terribly from fatigue. Much of the force was lost in the seemingly impassable marsh, and Hannibal the crossed the Apennines, where he lost his right eye to conjunctivitis. The Carthaginian army surprised the Romans when they arrived in Etruria. They were now able to plunder the plentiful stocks of food, and looted and razed the towns and villages in the region. The atrocities continued as all adult males they came across in the region were executed out of hand. Hannibal learnt of a Roman army at Arretium, and was eager to bring it to battle before it could be reinforced. He assumed that there would be another Roman army on the Adriatic coast, and thus wanted to crush this army before it could be reinforced.
The Roman Consul Flaminius set off in pursuit of Hannibal, their hearts sinking as they passed through the devastated territories of the ravaged region. The legions existed to protect the people of Italia – seeing the brunt fields and razed towns was glaringly humiliating evidence of their failure. Furthermore, the legions were comprised of these small holding farmers who managed these small landholdings in the countryside. As they marched through the battered land, it was their farms and homes there were seeing destroyed, their families being displaced, captured and killed. A fury arose in their hearts, coupled with an intense desolation at the destruction. Flaminius stoked this hatred while emboldening his men, explaining that Hannibal was fleeing south as they advanced, that they would enjoy an easy victory to avenge their brethren and their comrades at the Trebia. They thus surged forward, not bothering with proper reconnaissance as they closed to within a day’s march of the Carthaginian camp. Hannibal bypassed the garrisoned city of Cortona in June, and instead marched to the shore of Lake Trasimene. Hannibal by now had around 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, while Flaminius led two Roman and two allied legions – around 25,000 men.
The road led along the north shore of the lake, then turned south to follow the shore before climbing away through a defile. North of the road was a range of low hills which crept closer to the lake as it went east, while the defile further reduced the open ground betwixt the hills and the lake. Hannibal encamped where the hills were closest to the lake, clearly visible to the legions. At nightfall, Hannibal dispatched various sections of his army to march behind the hills at the north of the lake to take up concealed positions within the woodland. Despite the notorious difficulty of night marches and troops alerting enemies or becoming lost, Hannibal’s men managed to find their way without alerting the Romans. The Carthaginian cavalry were furthest west, the Cisalpine Gallic infantry east of them, and the veteran African and Celtiberian soldiers furthest east, near their camp. The Punic light cavalry was around the defile, reinforcing the Gauls there.
On the morning of 21 June 217 BC, Flaminius’ legions set off early to march east along the northern edge of the lake. A thick morning mist had descended and crippled visibility, and Flaminius expected battle as they lumbered forward in three parallel columns, their standard formation which could be quickly wheeled and deployed – though the speed of this was relative to their opponents, as forming an army for battle could take several hours under the best circumstances. The velites marched ahead to screen the Romans, though Flaminius did not bother to send cavalry scouts ahead, which was not unusual.
The leading legionaries came into contact with the Carthaginians based to the east, expecting to smash into their full force. A signal was given – likely to blowing of the spine-chilling Gallic carnyx – and this sound was echoed down the side of the lake. The Romans were suddenly paralysed in fear, as the lifeless woods around them became alive with the sound of weapons being drawn, confusion thriving as the legions could not see anyone through the mist and woodland. The Carthaginians launched themselves out of the forest at the legions, with the unexpectedness and the mist meaning that not even a rudimentary fighting line could be formed. Some of the Romans fled, others formed small pockets to fight back with. Those who ran were swiftly cut down by the nimble cavalry, and those groups who stood and fought were gradually cut down. The Gauls in the centre suffered particularly heavy losses before crushing the trapped Romans.
Flaminius was left completely bamboozled by the attack, and had no idea how to respond. After his initial shock he tried to rally his men, but soon he was recognised by those same Gauls he had campaigned against so successfully seven years earlier. Swarming around him, the Consul was swiftly hacked down by his embittered enemies. Seeing the death of Flaminius, the remaining legions now broke. Many attempted to swim across the lakes, but few could swim in the best of times, much less encumbered in full armour. The weight of the mailed armour and helmets pulled thousands of legionaries beneath the surface of Lake Trasimene. Those who did not wish to swim thought they may find sanctuary by merely wading out until they were neck deep. The Numidian cavalry merely used this as an exercise to walk their horses out through the water and then hack through the exposed necks.
The only failure of the trap was of the 6,000 legionaries leading the column, who were likely the most prepared for battle. Just as at Trebia, when they realised that the battle behind them was lost, they marched on. Later that day though they were entirely surrounded by the Carthaginian cavalry, and surrendered to Maharbal on the promise of being disarmed and freed, with “a garment apiece”. Hannibal disapproved of this clemency, and while he allowed the Italian allies to go free, all of the Romans were sold into slavery. Many of the Carthaginian infantry now took to equipping themselves from the armour and weapons of the tens of thousands of Roman dead.
The Battle of Lake Trasimene was another decisive victory for Hannibal, and perhaps the only instance in history of concealing an entire army for ambush. The second Roman army under Geminus, which had been marching west from the Adriatic to join Flaminius, whose defeat he was unaware of, saw his entire cavalry force ambushed by Hannibal while scouting ahead, with 2,000 killed outright and the rest surrounded and captured the following day. Geminus withdrew his infantry back to Ariminum (modern Rimini) to avoid further engagement. Hannibal’s clemency towards captured Italians saw them returned home in the hope of breaking Rome’s system of alliances, and getting their states to defect to Carthage, and thus isolate Rome. Hannibal marched through Etruria, then Umbria, to the Adriatic, continuing his devastation and plundering as he went. The Gauls were especially brutal in executing adult men they came across on the march. The army acquired so much booty that they could not carry anymore. They marched south into Apulia, looking to win the Greeks of southern Italia to Carthage.
News of the defeat panicked Rome. Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus was elected as dictator, and after these two traumatic defeats he laid out a new strategy – not engaging with Hannibal directly, and instead deploying a scorched earth policy, the “Fabian Strategy” to instead wear down Hannibal and his army without fighting them, a strategy that would earn him the moniker “Fabius the Delayer”. Hannibal would spend a year ravaging Apulia, until the Romans returned to their usual aggressiveness and decided to take the war to Hannibal. This time they would raise the greatest army the republic had ever seen, some 80,000 legionaries taking to the field to finally crush the Carthaginian invader.
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