1-Acest articol este copiat !
2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.
The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting of five thousand men besides allies. Most of their wars are decided by one consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field.” (Polybius)
In Hispania, the middle Barcid brother Hasdrubal used the Spring on 217 BC to march an expedition north of the River Ebro, commanding the army with his adjutant Himilco leading the fleet. Fearing that his army would be outnumbered, Gnaeus sought a naval battle now that his 35 quinqueremes had been reinforced with 20 from Massilia. Gnaeus managed to surprise Himilco, whose men hastily boarded their ships to prepare for battle. As they advanced out of the estuary, the Romans sank four and boarded two of his ships. Losing heart, the rest of the Punic fleet beached their ships and fled inland. The Battle of Ebro River was a rare reverse for Carthage in the early stages of the Second Punic War.
Hasdrubal had to recall his expedition for fear of naval raids, and had lost the Iberian contingent of his navy. He neither requested new ships from Carthage nor built new ones, and the dismissal of the lowly Iberian troops triggered the rebellion of the Turdetani, forcing Hasdrubal to send 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry against them the following year, which was spent subduing rebellions. A year after Trebia, Scipio the Elder finally landed in Iberia, bringing with him two more legions – though there would be no more reinforcements for six years. The Senate instructed that the Roman base on the peninsula be used to prevent any assistance reaching Hannibal’s occupying force in Italy.
Hannibal Barca had already killed betwixt 80 and 10,000 Roman soldiers by the time 217 BC drew to a close. His invasion of Italy to trigger the Second Punic War had begun with two spectacular victories, and while Italian allied soldiers were invariably released, Roman citizen soldiers were either executed or sold into slavery. Hannibal’s grand plan was to dismantle Rome’s alliance model that essentially made the other Italian civilisations – the Samnites, Etruscans, Campanians, Latins, and many more – their vassals, and who contributed up to two thirds of Rome’s legionaries. As Hannibal continued south through Etruria, and then to the Adriatic coast through Umbria, he hoped to see defections of the Italian allies, particularly among the Greeks in the south of the peninsula.
After the latest defeat at Lake Trasimene, Rome had initially panicked before electing Quintus Fabius Maximus as dictator – a six-month office with a specific remit, though the power to circumvent the usual checks and balances, such as Senatorial voting. Fabius adopted the “Fabian Strategy”, avoiding pitched battle and instead relying on low level harassment and scorched earth to wear Hannibal down – it is always easier to supply a defending army than an invading one. Hannibal was left largely free to ravage Apulia as Fabius focussed elsewhere – much to the ire of his fickle contemporaries. Earning the moniker “Fabius the Delayer”, the dictator did enjoy some success, at one point using some swift manoeuvring to almost pin the Carthaginian army in a valley. Despite this, his limited engagement would prove hugely unpopular among his fellow Romans, as they realised there would be no quick end to the war this way as they watched their land being ravaged. Hannibal marched through the richest and most fertile lands of Italy, hoping to draw Fabius into battle, but the dictator refused.
When Fabius’ term as dictator came to an end, the Senate did not renew his imperium. Instead his powers were passed onto the temporary suffect-Consuls Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus, before the consular elections for 216 BC returned Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus to the top jobs. The consular elections were always problematic as there were two posts, the winner being elected Senior Consul and the runner-up junior, each holding the fasces (rods of authority) on alternating month. This election system regularly saw opponents elected to serve alongside each other, famously in the late republic with consulships such as Crassus and Pompey, and Caesar and Bibilus. While there were occasional consular partnerships, usually the two men in the top posts were of opposing political views, and thus contradicted each other. In this instance, Varro had been a Praetor under the command of Paullus in the Second Illyrian War, yet now they had to work alongside one another as equals.
Usually, two Consuls would take the field with separate armies under their command, though now the Senate was determined to crush the Carthaginian invaders with the greatest force ever raised. An army of unprecedented size was raised, with eight legions and their allies making an army around 86,000-strong. This was the largest army raised in the history of Rome. Given the sheer size of this force, it had two camps though stayed together as one army, with command alternating each day betwixt the cautious Paullus and the reckless Varro.
In the Spring of 216 BC, Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at Cannae, in the Apulian plain, placing himself betwixt the Romans and a crucial grain depot. Polybius stated that: “the capture of Cannae "caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact that it commanded the surrounding district". Paullus and Varro marched south to confront Hannibal, and after two days were camping just six miles (10km) away from his position. Varro commanded on the first day, and full of hubris he sought a quick victory, only to be ambushed by Hannibal’s light infantry and cavalry. He repelled them, and this minor victory swelled the moral among his men. Paullus was more prudent and thought it unwise to fight on open ground, with Hannibal maintaining the advantage in cavalry. He also thought it unwise to withdraw after this initial success, and so camped two-thirds of the army east of the River Aufidus, and the remainder fortifying camp on the opposite bank a mile away. This second camp was to cover foraging party from the main camp, which were liable to being routed by the Numidian cavalry. At this point the Romans supposedly had an army of 86,400 men, with 80,000 of those infantry, while Hannibal had 40,000 infantry, and 10,000 cavalry. Furthermore, Hannibal’s army was an eclectic mix of Gauls, Celtiberians, Numidians, Libyans, and more. Livy described the Carthaginian army as: “a hotch-potch of the riff-raff of all nationalities.”
The two armies stayed in their positions for two days. On the second day, 1 August, Hannibal left his camp and proffered battle – well aware that Varro would be commanding the following day. Paullus was ridiculed by his co-Consul for refusing battle, not wanting to fight on rough terrain for fear of an ambush, and not wanting to fight on open plain for fear of Hannibal’s cavalry. Hannibal recognised the importance of water from the Aufidus to the legions, and sent his cavalry to the smaller Roman camp to harass the water bearers. His horsemen rode to the edge of the camp, causing havoc and thoroughly disrupting the water supply.
As command of the army changed the next day to Varro, Hannibal knew he would not refuse battle. Another issue of the changing hands of the command was that each man would wish to seize the glory, and thus by acting on the day when he was in command could do so. As the vast Roman host lined up, one of Hannibal’s adjutants Gisgo expressed his astonishment at its size. "There is one thing, Gisgo, yet more astonishing", Hannibal coolly replied, "which you take no notice of. In all those great numbers before us, there is not one man called Gisgo", provoking laughter that spread through the Carthaginian ranks.
The Romans went with their standard formation, though bizarrely chose to have a deep centre of infantry rather than a wide one. This meant they had a front around 2,000-men across, but around 35 – 50 ranks deep, and though it could not outflank the Punic army, the plan was to simply bulldoze through them – as the centre had at the Battle of Trebia, which Varro now planned to replicate on a larger scale. Hannibal understood the Romans planned to fight by pouring infantry into the centre, and prepared accordingly. His forces were deployed based on the strengths of each unit, with his Balearic slingers behind his infantry, and the Iberians, Celtiberians and Gauls in the centre, with himself and his brother Mago. Having the least reliable or weaker troops at the centre was fairly common, with the flanks to stop them routing, though it prevented a vulnerable centre for the legions. The African veteran infantry was on the wings, while Hasdrubal led the Spannish and Gallic cavalry on the left, by the Aufidus, using the river and cavalry protect one flank, and his Numidian cavalry under Hanno to guard the other. The Roman right was guarded by the river, with a hill behind them, making the left flank their only means of retreat.
The trumpets sounded, and the legions marched forward. Facing east, the rising sun shone in their eyes, while the south easterly wind blew sand and dust into their faces. The ground thundered at the sound of 80,000 armoured men marching forward in unison. There was fear amongst all as Pan stalked the battlefield, but also determination and anger to crush these invaders. The cavalry drew their horses into a tight formation and prepared for their own advance. The Battle of Cannae was about to begin.
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