Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-31!

 1-Acest articol este copiat !

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

"Killing must feel good to God too. He does it all the time. Did God feel good about that? He felt powerful."

In late December 218 BC, some 40,000 Roman legionaries stood on the western bank of the River Trebia in northern Italy, staring at a similar number of Gauls, Numidians, Libyans, Celtiberians, and the rest of the eclectic mix of nationalities that made up Hannibal Barca’s army. The legionaries were tired, having awoken early to answer the call to arms. They were hungry, having marched from their camp before they had the chance to have breakfast. They were afraid, despite the confidence their commander told them to have in the face of their enemy, with many of them fresh recruits to the legions of Cisalpine Gaul. Perhaps worst of all, they were freezing cold, first being forced to ford the chest deep, freezing waters of the Trebia, before standing still in the snow for hours as the army was lined up for battle. Finally, they were ready to advance.

Hannibal’s army was formed up symmetrically, with 8,000 Gauls in the centre, flanked by 6,000 of his Celtiberian and African veterans – this was a common tactic to place the most “unreliable” forces in the centre, reducing the chance for them to rout by guarding the flanks with veterans. On the far side of each were the handful of surviving elephants, and the 5,000 cavalry. The legions lined up in an opposite formation, with around 13,000 heavy infantry in the centre, flanked by 17,000 Italian allied infantry, which included a large number of Cenomani Gauls who remained loyal to Rome. The survivors of the 6,000 velites regrouped in the rear, and the 4,000 cavalry was placed on the wings. Given the larger number of heavy infantry, the Romans expected to bulldoze through their opponents, overwhelming them by sheer weight of numbers. Hannibal also had to thin his line to prevent it from being outflanked, while the elephants there discouraged an infantry attack.

The cavalry on each side charged each other. The Roman horse were not only outnumbered, but tired from chasing the Numidians earlier and fording the river, and suffering from Carthaginian missile fire. This contest was over swiftly, the Punic horsemen swiftly routing the Romans and driving them back over the Trebia. The Carthaginian light infantry now moved around the exposed Roman flanks, forcing the velites to engage them. The Roman legionaries also turned to face this threat, but that ended the impetus of the forward march. In densely packed formations of tens of thousands of men, often those at the centre and the back gaged how well a battle was going by their direction of movement – or lack of. A successful battle saw them going forward, a closely contested one was a standstill, and looming defeat saw them pushed back. It took exceptional commanding to reverse such retreats and prevent them from turning to rout. In an age without modern communication, it took extraordinarily well discipled soldiers to not break and flee at the first sign of trouble. There were relatively few casualties in ancient battles, with the majority of the killing occurring once one army was broken and they were being pursued without mercy. If such a rout was to happen, the best thing for an individual soldier was to abandon his shield and be among the first to flee. If he were to remain out of curiosity to see how the battle developed, it would often then be too late to escape, and his curiosity would see him cut down and left as carrion for the crows.

While the battle raged on, the hidden 2,000 men under Mago now made its way down the river and onto the plain, leaving them in place to attack the Roman left rear. The heavy Roman infantry were getting the better of the fighting in the centre, their blood warming with the combat and their front ranks sensing victory. Mago’s force charged into the velites already fending off the Punic cavalry, and the cavalry which had been pursuing the broken Roman horse now re-joined the battle to attack the Roman rear. Normally the cavalry and infantry battles were contested essentially as separate affairs, with the triumphant cavalry merely chasing down their defeated foes far from the battlefield, while enjoying the flexibility to flee themselves if their infantry lost. As more Carthaginian cavalry now piled into the Roman rear, the pressure told and the Latin allies, Gauls and velites began to rout.

The legionaries in the centre managed to break the 8,000 Gauls facing them, and a unit of African veterans, punching clean through Hannibal’s army. Achieving this, their pursuit was halted to be reorganised to re-join the battle, but it was clear by now that the Battle of Trebia was lost. Sempronius, who was fighting with the infantry, ordered them to maintain formation and march away. Some 10,000 of them forded the freezing Trebia again, and took refuge in the nearby city of Placentia, unmolested by Hannibal, who focussed on hacking down the now-surrounded allies. Aside from that group who escaped, almost all of the Roman army at Trebia was annihilated. Hannibal’s losses were heaviest in his Gallic infantry, though losses among his veterans and cavalry were relatively light. Shortly before his 30th birthday, Hannibal Barca had begun to fulfil his promise to his father by smashing his first Roman army.

Scipio gathered the camp guard and marched to join Sempronius at Placentia. News of the defeat spread panic in Rome, but was calmed when Sempronius arrived to hold the consular elections. Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Gaius Flaminius were elected, the latter six years after his successful punitive raids into Cisalpine Gaul top cow the Celts into submission. Both Placentia and Cremona were isolated by the Punic cavalry, but could be supplied by boat up the River Po. More legions were raised, Sardinia was reinforced, Tarentum was garrisoned, and supply depots established at Ariminum and Arretium in Etruria. Two new armies, each of two Roman and two Italian allied legions, were formed with strong cavalry contingents, with one stationed at Arretium on the Adriatic coast to block Hannibal’s route to central Italia. Carthage, not Rome, was now the dominant force in Cisalpine Gaul, and now hordes of Gallic tribesmen flocked to them accordingly. Hannibal’s army swelled to 60,000 strong. The advantage was with Hannibal, and he had no intention of allowing Rome to recover.