Dusmanul la Poarta!-Partea-30!

 1-Acest articol este copiat .

2-Istoria ramane pasiunea mea nr-1.

“My men, let me tell you what kind of warfare you must expect. It will be against an enemy you defeated in the last war, on land and at sea. An enemy from whom you have exacted tribute for 20 years. An enemy from whom you took Sicily and Sardinia as spoils of war. You therefore will enter upon it with the high heart of victors, they in the despondency of beaten men. Nay more, their readiness to fight at all is due not to courage, but necessity – unless you imagine that an enemy who declined combat when his army was intact has better hopes of success now that he’s lost two thirds of his number in the passages of the Alps! Perhaps you will answer that though they are few they are nevertheless brave and strong, that they are irresistible fighters. Nonsense! They are ghosts and shadows of men, already half dead, with hunger, cold, dirt and neglect. All their strength has been beaten out of them by the Alpine crags. Cold has dried them up, snowstorms have frozen their sinews, their hands and feet are frostbitten, their horses lame and feeble, and they’ve not a weapon among them which is not damaged or broken. What an army! Why, you’ll not be facing an enemy at all, only the dregs of what once were men. My chief fear is that that we shall have to admit that it was the Alps, and not you, who conquered Hannibal. Ah well, perhaps it was right that the gods, without human aid, should have fought the first stages of a war with treaty-breakers like these. We, who after heaven have suffered from their treachery, have the duty only of bringing that war to its conclusion.”

Hannibal Barca was encamped in northern Italia (Cisalpine Gaul), but became worried of news that, far from supporting him, many of the native Gauls were in communication with Rome. Given their hatred for Rome following recent defeats and punitive campaigns, he had hoped they would flock en masse to support his beleaguered army following their Alpine crossing. Given Hannibal’s odds against Rome looked slim though, it is understandable that the Gauls may use the opportunity of their support to leverage better terms from Rome. Hannibal thus sent a force, including those Gauls who had pledged fealty to him, to pillage the surrounding area and pressure their kin into joining him. This provoke a Roman retaliation of cavalry and velites, with the numbers involved escalating on both sides. A Carthaginian raiding force was routed, but in turn their Roman pursuers were driven back from the Punic camp.

The Roman Consul Scipio had a low opinion of Hannibal’s Numidian cavalry after his forces had apparently got the better of them in a skirmish beside the Rhone near Massilia (Marseilles). He failed to appreciate that they were merely screening the Carthaginian manoeuvring then as Hannibal sought to cross the Alps rather than engage the legions in Gaul. Scipio thus expected an extended exchange of javelins with the horsemen, and that his infantry velites would get the better of this exchange, being small targets and with a shield. Scipio thus placed 2,000 Gallic cavalry ahead of his velites, and upon seeing Hannibal’s massed cavalry they swarmed forward. The Punic cavalry charged them and the velites, realising they would be cut down, made no attempt to throw their pilla (javelins), and merely turned tail and fled. The close order Roman cavalry – bunched up knee-to-knee in preparation to charge the Carthaginians – attempted a counter charge, but had their formation thrown into disarray and broken by their own infantry trying to filter betwixt them.

The Gallic cavalry advanced to the Numidians and then dismounted, with some of the velites who had not fled supporting them. The ensuing melee continued for some time, before the Carthaginian light cavalry swept behind both ends of the battle line to attack the partially regrouped, but still disorganised, velites. Aware of their vulnerability, the velites broke again and fled. The reserve Roman cavalry tasked with protecting the rear were now thrown into the same disarray as their vanguard counterparts, and were surrounded. Scipio himself was badly wounded in the fighting that followed. Scipio’s 16-year-old son – Scipio the Younger (for now!) – led a small counter charge which cut their way through and managed to escort his father from the field.

The surviving Roman forces withdrew to their camp, their cavalry having suffered heavy losses. Aware that the superior Carthaginian cavalry could now isolate his camp, Scipio withdrew and had his pontoon bridge dissembled. Hannibal pursued the next day a captured 600 stragglers, but did not want the situation to escalate into a full scale battle given the Roman heavy infantry was still intact. The Romans were willing to attack uphill, and the Carthaginians unwilling to commit to battle, and left the field. Thus both sides claimed victory at the initial clash at the Battle of Ticinus, though Rome had suffered the heaviest losses, including one of its Consuls.

The Roman Senate panicked at the news of Scipio’s injury, and promptly recalled his co-Consul Sempronius to take command of the forces in Cisalpine Gaul. He interpreted the clash as Roman cavalry dominating their Carthaginian counterparts, and was eager for a full-scale battle. He also wanted this for political reasons – victory before Scipio’s recovery would see him alone take the credit and the triumph. It was also December, and with his Consulship due to end with the year, he was likely have to forfeit command – and the opportunity for victory – to his successor. Scipio wished to avoid a quick battle and wear Hannibal down, though Sempronius saw this as him wanting to recover sufficiently to ensure his own part of the glory. Hannibal, meanwhile, saw this early victory swell his numbers with disaffected Gauls, and now wanted a set-piece battle before winter set in and he suffered desertions due to boredom, while he was also conscious of their fickle nature in shifting allegiance. Given how enthusiastically Sempronius reinforced his cavalry, Hannibal felt confident he could bring the legions to battle.

The terrain betwixt the two main camps on either side of the River Trebia was a clear, flat plain, impossible for ambush – an ideal ground for the indomitable Roman legions to crush the Carthaginian invaders. Despite this, Hannibal managed to hide his younger brother Mago with 1,000 cavalry and infantry in an old watercourse full of brush during the night, south of his intended battle site. The next morning, in late December 218 BC, there was frost on the ground, and snow falling. Shortly before daybreak Hannibal had his camp rise, ensuring his men were well fed, their muscles oiled. His Numidian cavalry forded the Trebia and forced back the Roman pickets, attacked the edges of Sempronius’ camp. The Consul ordered his cavalry to ride out in force, and Polybius wrote that: “the Numidians easily scattered and retreated, but afterwards wheeled round and attacked with great daring—these being their peculiar tactics.” The confrontation descended into a wheeling mass of cavalry, with the Numidians refusing to withdraw, and so Sempronius sent forth first his 6,000 velites, and then the whole force of his 40,000-strong army, who had risen quickly and not had time to eat or prepare themselves.

The Numidians slowly withdrew, the entire Roman army pursing in three columns some 2.5 miles (4km) long. Into the icy waters of the Trebia they marched, the river flowing up to their chests, with no respite as they exited on the far bank and the icy cold wind blew against them. Hypothermia was setting into the first across before the whole host had forded, and being an ancient battle it would take hours to draw such a body of men into battle formation. Those of you who ever experienced true, bitter cold that has driven you to the brink of hypothermia can share some empathy with the legions of that day, though instead of hoping for a warm shower they remained stood still in the cold, only the prospect of vicious battle awaiting them. The Roman velites advanced, but had spent most of their pilum against the Numidians, who were now resupplied. The Balearic slingers could easily outrange the Roman velites. No breakfast, fording the river, forming for battle, gaining the upper hand in the missile skirmish – Hannibal’s genius lay in him turning hundreds of tiny advantages into one decisive advantage. The two armies closed. The Battle of Trebia was about to begin.